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Foreword
When Ethiopia embarked on a program of improving service delivery by decen-
tralizing power to the third, or woreda, level, we were initially skeptical. In the 
World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People, we 
asserted that the delivery of basic services requires two things: First, citizens must 
be able to hold politicians accountable for allocating resources and monitoring 
results; second, politicians in turn must be able to hold service providers—teach-
ers, doctors, nurses—accountable for quality delivery of services. We called these 
the two legs of the “long route of accountability.” While Ethiopia’s strong party 
affiliations and military traditions would make the second leg of the long route 
work well, the limited political competition at the national level potentially 
could weaken the first leg. Furthermore, whereas in principle decentralizing to 
the subnational level would make these accountability relationships work bet-
ter—citizens would be closer to political leaders, and politicians could better 
monitor service providers—the limited capacity in some of the woredas could act 
as a brake on progress.
Our skepticism was unwarranted. Ethiopia has experienced a remarkable 
improvement in service delivery outcomes. Child mortality has fallen from 123 
per thousand in 2005 to 88 in 2010, and the primary net enrollment rate rose 
from 68 percent in 2004/05 to 82 percent in 2009/10. This richly documented 
and analytically rigorous book explains why. While political competition at the 
national level remains limited, competition at the local level is healthy, with 
officials’ career advancement depending on their being able to meet develop-
ment and service delivery targets. The government has introduced social account-
ability mechanisms such as grievance redress through the Ethiopian Institution 
of the Ombudsman, financial transparency (the local budgets are posted in com-
mon areas), and citizen feedback on budget preparation and implementation. 
The government has also strengthened the second leg of the long route of 
accountability by recruiting teachers, health workers, and agricultural extension 
workers locally, and rates of provider absenteeism are now lower than in other 
countries in Africa. Greater citizen participation and the intrinsic motivation of 
people working in their local areas may have helped overcome the initially weak 
administrative capacity.
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The relative success of Ethiopia’s decentralized service delivery program is not 
a reason to be complacent, however. The achievements have arisen from a low 
base; Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The progress on 
indicators that people care about—students’ learning and overall health status—
has not been impressive. As these indicators are more specific to the individual, 
their achievement will require an even sharper focus on citizen voice and par-
ticipation. Ethiopia has demonstrated how much can be achieved by opening up 
the system to greater accountability “from below.” Just think how much more can 
be achieved by going further—and allowing poor people to participate fully in 
the delivery of services that are so important to them and their children.
Shantayanan Devarajan and Ritva Reinikka
Co-Director, World Development Report 2004
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This book was written by Qaiser M. Khan (Lead Economist, World Bank), Jean-
Paul Faguet (Professor for the Political Economy of Development, London 
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Poverty Specialist, World Bank), and Philip O’Keefe (Lead Economist, World 
Bank)—and other colleagues present at the review meeting, including DFID’s 
Ethiopia Team, Andrew Goodland (Senior Agriculture Economist, World Bank), 
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Economist, the World Bank). Before the review meeting, Yoseph Abdissa (Senior 
Social Protection Specialist, World Bank), Colin Andrews (Senior Social 
Protection Specialist, World Bank), Carlo del Ninno (Senior Economist, World 
Bank), G.N.V. Ramana (Lead Public Health Specialist, World Bank), and Huihui 
Wang (Senior Health Economist, World Bank) also provided comments on the 
report. The authors would also like to acknowledge the technical guidance and 
advice received from Deon Filmer (Lead Economist, World Bank) and Lynne 
Sherburne-Benz (Sector Manager, World Bank). Members of the Ethiopian gov-
ernment who provided invaluable assistance include Ato Temesgen Walelign 
(Development Planning and Research Directorate); Ato Degu Lakew 
(Government Accounts); Ato Alemayhu Gebretsadik, Ato Biratu Yigezu, and 
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Getachew Negera, Head of Channel One Program Coordinating Unit (Ministry 
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Development Report 2004, for writing the foreword to this book.
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Ethiopia, like most developing countries, has opted to deliver services such as 
basic education, primary health care, agricultural extension advice, water, and 
rural roads through a highly decentralized system (Manor 1999; Treisman 2007). 
That choice is based on several decades of theoretical analysis examining how a 
decentralized government might respond better to diverse local needs and pro-
vide public goods more efficiently than a highly centralized government.1
Ethiopia primarily manages the delivery of basic services at the woreda (dis-
trict) level. Those services are financed predominantly through intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers (IGFTs) from the federal to the regional and then the woreda 
administrations, although some woredas raise a small amount of revenue to sup-
port local services. Since 2006, development partners and the government have 
cofinanced block grants for decentralized services through the Promoting Basic 
Services (PBS) Program. Aside from funding the delivery of services, the program 
supports measures to improve the quality of services and local governments’ 
capacity to deliver them by strengthening accountability and citizen voice.2
Objectives
This study attempts to determine the extent to which spending at the woreda 
level on basic services is associated with key policy outputs and human outcomes. 
Woreda-level block grants primarily support locally recruited staff who provide 
basic services in five sectors (health, education, agriculture, water and sanitation, 
and rural roads). Because of limitations in the data, the analysis focuses on health, 
education, and agriculture. A parallel objective of the study is to assess the inci-
dence of these expenditures by wealth quintile, in line with the World Bank’s 
objective of achieving shared growth by reaching the bottom 40 percent. A final 
objective is to investigate whether the allocation of woreda-level block grants 
reflects the constitutional objective of providing additional resources to histori-
cally marginalized populations. In other words, how effective and equitable is 
spending on basic services at the woreda level? The study also looks at the effec-
tiveness of efforts to improve financial transparency and accountability, social 
accountability, and grievance redress mechanisms, because of their strong influ-
ence on the availability and quality of basic services.
Executive Summary
xviii Executive Summary
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Overall Findings on the Effectiveness of a Decentralized Approach to 
Service Delivery
Ethiopia’s model for delivering basic services appears to be succeeding and to 
confirm that services improve when service providers are more accountable to 
citizens. As discussed in the World Development Report 2004 (World Bank 2003), 
accountability for delivering basic services can take an indirect, long route, in 
which citizens influence service providers through government, or a more direct, 
short route between service providers and citizens. When the long, indirect route 
of accountability is ineffective, service delivery can suffer, especially among poor 
or marginalized citizens who find it challenging to express their views to policy 
makers.
In Ethiopia, the indirect route of accountability works well precisely because of 
decentralization. Service providers are strictly accountable to local governments 
for producing results, but in turn, the local authorities are held accountable by the 
regional and federal governments. A degree of local competition for power and 
influence helps to induce local authorities and service provides to remain open to 
feedback from citizens and take responsibility for results. The direct route of 
accountability has been reinforced by measures to strengthen financial transpar-
ency and accountability (educating citizens on local budgets and publicly provid-
ing information on budgets and service delivery goals), social accountability 
(improving citizens’ opportunities to provide feedback directly to local administra-
tors and service providers), and impartial procedures to redress grievances (insti-
tuting the independent Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman, for example).
Woreda-level spending, financed through IGFTs and supported by the PBS 
Program, has been a very effective strategy for Ethiopia to attain its Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Spending on health and education accounts for 80 
percent of PBS-financed spending by the woredas, which goes to pay for health 
extension workers (HEWs) and teachers. Although the link between numbers of 
personnel hired and services delivered must be treated with caution (and is being 
explored in detail in another study), this study finds evidence that woreda-level 
spending in health and education is effective.
Owing to the intervention of HEWs, the use of health services has increased, 
especially among the poorest quintiles. Every additional US$1 of per capita 
spending by the woredas on health is associated with a 7.5 percent increase in 
the contraceptive prevalence rate and an 12.4 percent increase in deliveries by 
skilled birth attendants (Wang et al., forthcoming) (two interventions that can 
reduce maternal mortality dramatically), as well as a 4 percent increase in ante-
natal care (which can reduce infant and child mortality significantly). For educa-
tion, an increase of US$1 per capita in spending by each woreda is associated 
with a 3.7 percent increase in the net primary enrollment rate within that 
woreda. Similar results are seen for the pupil-teacher ratio.
Finally, the effect of woreda-level spending on agricultural extension workers 
is associated with higher yields for major crops, including cereals, vegetables, 
enset, coffee, and fruit. Spending on agricultural extension workers increases the 
Executive Summary xix
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probability that farmers, regardless of the size of their plots, will use improved 
farming techniques.
Education, health, and agriculture account for 97 percent of woreda spending, 
which in turn constitutes 97 percent of PBS-financed IGFTs. This is comple-
mented by support for greater engagement among citizens, improvements in 
local capacity to manage resources, and better access to information on national 
and local budgeting and development objectives. While it is difficult to provide 
precise estimates of the impact of the latter activities, the direction of their effect 
is clear: Spending efficiency is improved through better capacity, more transpar-
ency, and greater accountability to citizens.
In interpreting these results, it is important to bear in mind that the chain of 
causality from woreda spending to results is direct for education: Spending on 
teachers directly drives enrollments. For health and agriculture, on the other 
hand, spending at the woreda level on health and agricultural extension workers 
is best described as catalytic, because it increases the effectiveness of systemwide 
spending (federal capital investments in medical infrastructure, for example, or 
national research to develop improved varieties for farmers). Yet overall, these 
findings demonstrate the power of the PBS-financed decentralized approach for 
improving access to basic services, encouraging broadly shared development, and 
propelling Ethiopia rapidly toward the MDGs.
Improving Accountability and Citizen Voice in Providing Basic Services
The social accountability component of the PBS Program has increased the 
opportunities for constructive collaboration between citizens and the state to 
improve basic public services in pilot areas. Even though woredas must operate 
under federal guidelines, they still exercise a significant amount of discretion that 
can affect the quality of life and services. More than 84 percent of those surveyed 
in pilot areas responded positively to social accountability initiatives, which had 
increased citizens’ awareness of their rights, responsibilities, and entitlements to 
basic services. After service providers and users drew up joint service improve-
ment plans, basic services improved, and so did the quality of the engagement 
between citizens and service providers. Through the financial transparency and 
accountability component of the PBS Program, citizens have become more aware 
of the government budgeting process, and they are advocating more effectively 
for their rights as a result. The PBS Program has also improved the efficiency of 
resource use by improving financial management and procurement capacity at 
the woreda level.
Grievance redress mechanisms are another means of ensuring that citizens’ 
voices are heard with respect to government services. A grievance redress mech-
anism provides the opportunity for an impartial third party to review a transac-
tion that has taken place between the government and a citizen or a group of 
citizens. Through dialogue and technical and financial support, the PBS Program 
is strengthening the Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman and the regional 
Grievance Handling Offices, which offer these services.
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Addressing Equity Issues in Providing Basic Services
Overall, the benefits of PBS-financed spending at the woreda level on health, 
education, and agriculture accrued to all income levels. Woreda-level spending on 
health and education is particularly pro-poor: 58 percent goes to the two bottom 
wealth quintiles.3 In agriculture, woreda-level spending (primarily for agricul-
tural extension workers) drives increases in output and the adoption of new, 
improved methods across all asset quintiles, although the magnitude was smaller 
for the bottom quintile, perhaps because of a lack of financing to purchase pro-
ductivity-enhancing inputs.
Spending on basic services also appears to be reaching females, especially 
spending on health and education. In fact, health spending is undeniably pro-
female, given that much of it promotes women’s access to services that have a 
strong impact on reducing maternal mortality—including contraception, ante-
natal care, and assisted deliveries. Education is the only sector for which 
expenditure can be associated with data on results, disaggregated by gender, 
albeit for only two indicators—net enrollment rate and net intake rate at the 
primary level. The coefficient for female primary school students is slightly 
higher than for males for both net enrollment and intake, although not sig-
nificant. The important finding is that no bias against females was found in 
expenditure on education, the sector that receives the bulk of PBS Program 
funds.
The results on agriculture tell a somewhat different and less clear story. 
Eighty-seven percent of Ethiopia’s farmers are male, and access to extension 
services was found to favor males. It is not certain whether this bias is driven by 
gender differences in crop choices, the quality of land farmed by men compared 
to women, or some other inherent gender bias. Further analysis is required to 
clarify these issues and develop policy responses based on the evidence.
A final important question related to equity is whether PBS Program 
resources channeled to the woredas are reaching Ethiopia’s historically dis-
advantaged regions and ethnic groups. The answer appears to be that in 
terms of basic service expenditure per capita, the current system broadly 
favors Ethiopia’s historically disadvantaged regions compared to the histori-
cally dominant ones. More than 50 percent of the woredas in Gambella and 
30 percent in Beneshangul-Gemuz—the two most disadvantaged regions of 
the country—spend more than 110 percent of the national average on the 
basic service sectors. Spending also appears to favor some historically disad-
vantaged ethnic groups, in accordance with constitutional mandates. Five 
majority-Anyiwak woredas are noteworthy for receiving the most public 
resources of all woredas in the nation. The exception occurs among the 
Somali groups. Federal transfers to Somali Region appear to be fine, but the 
region transfers a much smaller share to the woredas—49 percent, compared 
to the national average of 73 percent (excluding Addis Ababa) over the four 
years studied here.4
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Decentralized spending at the woreda level is both effective and pro-poor. The 
estimates provided here imply that the returns to this spending are far from 
decreasing, which means that Ethiopia has scope to increase spending and speed 
its attainment of the MDGs.
The current approach also appears to be helping some of Ethiopia’s histori-
cally disadvantaged areas and ethnic groups to catch up with the rest of the 
country. Expenditure to provide basic services at the woreda level is broadly 
equal across Ethiopia’s woredas, with the striking exception of a small number of 
woredas that are concentrated in the country’s most disadvantaged regions and 
receive significantly greater resources. Resource flows are lowest among the more 
developed, historically dominant regions.
In contrast to the predictions of some public management theories, the decen-
tralized provision of services in Ethiopia is not increasing regional, ethnic, or 
gender inequalities in investment inputs or service outputs. Indeed, the opposite 
seems to be true for education and health, where the impact of PBS-financed 
IGFT resources was disproportionately high among the bottom two quintiles and 
women. In sum, support for decentralized services in Ethiopia appears to be an 
effective use of development partners’ resources from both an efficiency and 
equity perspective.
The only exception to these findings is agriculture, for which the impact of 
PBS-financed IGFT expenditure was smaller for the bottom quintile. In this 
instance, a wide array of factors is likely to be at work, not the least of which 
could be poor farmers’ inability to pay for productivity-enhancing inputs, land of 
poor quality, or water management issues that could not be controlled for in the 
analysis (except for rainfall).
Although quantitative evidence is unavailable at present, descriptive evidence 
from the first phase of the Ethiopia Social Accountability Program implies that 
structured feedback sessions involving citizens and service providers are strength-
ening citizens’ participation in pilot areas. That evidence, together with the 
strong guidance emerging from governance and accountability theory, argues for 
the continued application of social accountability tools and the development of 
policies to sustain their use in the Ethiopian context. This conclusion can be 
verified when the impact assessment for the second phase of the Ethiopia Social 
Accountability Program becomes available.
The difficulty of conducting subnational empirical work on Ethiopia cannot 
be overstated. Creating the database for this study required considerable effort 
and improvisation on the part of the research team. The resulting standardized 
database of woreda-level expenditures and characteristics, which will be made 
public, is a major output of this study. The data will be augmented with new data 
collected under the third phase of the PBS Program and used in future research 
related to the program. It is hoped that in time this dataset will become a useful 
tool for researchers and students elsewhere in Africa and beyond.
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Notes
 1. See, for example, Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972), Besley and Coate (2003), and Faguet 
(2000, 2012).
 2. The design of the PBS Program is influenced by the accountability triangle between 
government, service providers, and citizens (see World Bank 2003 and figure I.1 in the 
main text).
 3. The Ethiopia section of an ongoing, multicountry study (Woldehanna, Tsehaye, and 
Hill, forthcoming) also finds that spending on primary education in Ethiopia (which 
is mostly managed by the woredas) is pro-poor—more so than overall spending on 
education (33 percent goes to the two bottom wealth quintiles).
 4. Although spending at the woreda level in Somali Region appears to be lower than 
required to compensate for decades of underinvestment in basic services, the data for 
Somali woredas may be understated; some expenditures normally paid by woredas in 
other regions are paid regionally due to security and capacity constraints.
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AGSS Agriculture Sample Survey
AIDS acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ANC antenatal care
CAR contraceptive acceptance rate
CSA Central Statistical Agency
DelSBA deliveries by skilled birth attendants
DHS Demographic and Health Survey
EFY Ethiopia fiscal year
EIO Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman
ETB Ethiopian birr
FBG Federal Block Grant
FTA financial transparency and accountability
GDP gross domestic product
HEW health extension worker
HIV human immunodeficiency virus
IDA International Development Association
IGFT intergovernmental fiscal transfer
MDG Millennium Development Goal
NER net enrollment rate
NIR net intake rate
PBS  Promoting Basic Services (formerly, Protection of Basic Services) 
Program
PTR pupil-teacher ratio
SNNP Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (Region)
WASH Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
WBG Woreda Block Grant
Abbreviations
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Introduction and Background
Among Ethiopia’s recent impressive development results, its rapid improvement 
in basic service delivery indicators is outstanding. The Overseas Development 
Institute reports that Ethiopia has moved faster toward the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) than all but two other developing countries (ODI 
2010). According to the latest Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 
data, child mortality fell from 123 per thousand in 2005 to 88 in 2010, and the 
primary net enrollment rate rose from 68 percent in 2004/05 to 82 percent in 
2009/10.
Progress in delivering basic services over the past 10 years has been coupled 
with impressive economic growth: Gross development product (GDP) grew by 
11 percent per annum on average between 2004/05 and 2009/10, according to 
official estimates. Initially led by agriculture, growth has become more broad 
based, with rising contributions from the mining, services, and manufacturing 
sectors. Ethiopia’s growth may have slowed more recently, but it remains among 
the highest of any country in the world. The share of the population living in 
absolute poverty is declining as well: It fell from 38.7 percent in 2004/05 to 29.6 
percent in 2011, according to official data.
All of these results spring from a long-term, concerted government commit-
ment to pro-poor development. Building on the Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Program 2002–04/05 and the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty 2005–10, the government’s current 
development plan, the Growth and Transformation Plan, aims to achieve the 
MDGs by 2015 and middle-income status for Ethiopia by 2020–23. Ethiopia 
achieved the MDG-4 (Child Mortality) target in 2014, ahead of schedule, and 
appears to be on track to reach the other MDGs by 2015, according to United 
Nations progress reports.
Under its constitution and legal framework, the government is committed to 
maintaining the integrity and capacity of the nation’s decentralized administra-
tions down to the woreda level.1 Within Ethiopia’s federal structure, the central 
government provides unearmarked block grants through regional governments, 
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which in turn provide block grants to woreda administrations to deliver services to citizens. 
This administrative and financial structure has provided timely, predictable financing to sup-
port a steady and impressive increase in basic services throughout the country. But has 
Ethiopia’s decentralized approach to delivering basic services been cost effective?
For decades, analysts have debated whether decentralization can make government more 
responsive to diverse local needs and more efficient in providing public goods.2 The job of 
providing basic services generally falls to local governments, so building their capacity is an 
important part of improving basic services. For shared growth and development to occur, it 
is vital that such services reach the poorest 40 percent of the population. Ethiopia’s fiscal 
architecture makes it a rich, promising empirical setting for investigating the effectiveness 
of decentralization as a tool for improving both the quality and distribution of public sector 
outputs. The evidence that Ethiopia can offer is especially welcome because so much of the 
empirical evidence that has accumulated on decentralization over the past four decades has 
been inconclusive.
Consider the evidence from the broadest empirical surveys. Rondinelli, Cheema, and Nellis 
(1983) note that decentralization has usually disappointed its advocates. Most developing 
countries have encountered serious administrative problems in implementing decentraliza-
tion. The few comprehensive evaluations that have been conducted of the costs and benefits 
of decentralization report limited success in some countries but none in others. A decade and 
a half later, surveys by Piriou-Sall (1998), Manor (1999), and Smoke (2001) were slightly 
more positive but contained caveats about the strength of the evidence in favor of decentral-
ization. Manor notes that the evidence, though extensive, is incomplete, but concludes that 
“while decentralization…is no panacea, it has many virtues and is worth pursuing.” Smoke, by 
contrast, finds the evidence mixed and anecdotal, and asks whether there is any empirical 
justification for pursuing decentralization. Given the sheer size of the literature, the lack of 
progress toward an overarching conclusion is surprising.
It is worth noting that more recent empirical studies, which are often technically more 
sophisticated thanks to the enormous improvement in data from developing countries over 
recent decades, are generally more positive about decentralization’s potential. At least five 
recent studies address the link between decentralization and substantive outcomes directly 
and with rigorous quantitative evidence. Escaleras and Register (2012) find that fiscal 
decentralization is associated with lower natural disaster death rates, implying more effec-
tive preparation and/or responses to natural disasters by countries with decentralized gov-
ernments. Clark (2009) applies regression discontinuity to a natural experiment from Great 
Britain and concludes that schools opting out of the centralized education regime—in effect 
decentralizing themselves—enjoy large increases in student achievement. Galiani, Gertler, 
and Schargrodsky (2008) find that moving the control of schools from central to provincial 
governments in Argentina had a positive impact on students’ test scores. The poorest, how-
ever, did not gain from decentralization and indeed may have lost. Barankay and Lockwood 
(2007) report that greater decentralization of education to Swiss cantons is associated with 
higher educational attainment, especially for boys. By adding empirical evidence from 
Ethiopia, a low-income country where large programs in decentralization and public invest-
ment are yielding potentially significant results, this study makes an important contribution 
to the literature.
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Context and Structure of This Book
This book is based on a report issued as part of a programmatic knowledge series for Ethiopia 
on improving services for the poorest citizens.3 Future reports will elucidate the findings pre-
sented here in several ways. For example, they will present the results of additional studies of 
the quality of service delivery in health and education, drawing on data from ongoing surveys; 
offer a detailed assessment of the impact of the Promoting Basic Services (PBS) Program, 
based on multiround surveys over the next three years; and assess the impact of the social 
accountability component of PBS (the baseline survey is complete, and a full report is due in 
two years). The findings reported here will be updated next year, when results from the mini 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) are available, but they are being issued now to pro-
vide input into the government’s next Growth and Transformation Plan.
This book begins by describing the PBS Program and detailing how intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers (IGFTs) are channeled through Ethiopia’s decentralized federal structure to support 
the provision of basic services. The sections that follow focus on the approach used for the 
analysis, along with the governance and accountability mechanisms that are integral to the 
PBS Program. Findings on the effectiveness of local spending (IGFTs) for achieving develop-
ment results in education, health, and agriculture are reported in detail. Subsequent sections 
examine the equity impacts of the PBS Program with respect to income, gender, and histori-
cally disadvantaged regions and ethnic groups. The book concludes with a summary of the 
results and a series of recommendations. Four appendixes provide additional details on the 
methodology and context for the study.
The Promoting Basic Services Program
Through the PBS Program, the Government of Ethiopia and development partners cofinance 
block grants to support the provision of basic services at the local level (the government’s 
share of the financing is larger and rising). The block grants are distributed from the federal 
government to the regional governments using a formula that adjusts for the size of the popu-
lation in each region and for need, based on the current level of development and historic lack 
of access to services. The funds are transmitted from the regions to the woredas using regional 
formulas based on similar criteria.
Aside from providing block grants to woredas, the PBS Program supports various measures 
designed to improve the quality of basic services and local governments’ capacity to manage 
them. The program’s design is influenced by the concept of the “accountability triangle” 
between policy makers, citizens, and service providers, described in the World Development 
Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People (figure I.1). The program’s design recog-
nizes that the long “indirect route” of accountability, in which citizens appeal to policy makers 
(government) to hold service providers to account, must be complemented by a shorter 
“direct route,” in which citizens can directly hold service providers accountable for results.
In Ethiopia, the indirect route of accountability works well precisely because of decentral-
ization (box I.1). Service providers are strictly accountable to local governments for producing 
results, but, in turn, the local authorities are held accountable by the regional and federal 
governments for delivering basic services and reaching the delivery targets set in the Growth 
and Transformation Plan. The teachers, health workers, and agricultural extension workers 
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Figure I.1 The Triangle of Accountability in Service Delivery
Policy makers
ProvidersPoor people
More Choice and Participation
Stronger Voice Stronger Compact
Source: World Bank 2003.
who deliver those services are recruited and managed by the woreda leadership. 
Local competition for these leadership positions is significant, and officeholders 
are keen to reach their service delivery targets. This arrangement encourages 
local authorities to listen to citizens and take responsibility for results. On the 
other hand, the direct route of accountability is reinforced by measures that 
strengthen financial transparency and accountability (educating citizens on local 
budgets and service delivery goals), social accountability (improving citizens’ 
opportunities to provide feedback directly to local administrators and service 
providers), and impartial procedures to redress grievances (instituting the inde-
pendent Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman, for example).
Recognizing the critical role of good information to improve development 
outcomes, the PBS Program also finances a range of surveys and other data col-
lection and management efforts. Capacity building includes training in financial 
management and procurement for local woredas, in addition to other types of 
training, based on demand.
Woreda-level block grants primarily support locally recruited staff in five 
decentralized sectors (education, health, agriculture, water and sanitation, and 
rural roads). With some minor exceptions, woredas have very little revenue of 
their own, and they receive no other regular and predictable transfers that can be 
used to support staff. For that reason, total woreda spending in sectors relevant 
to the PBS Program is used here as a proxy for the block grants cofinanced by 
PBS partners and the government. Health sector spending focuses on health 
extension workers (HEWs), education spending on teachers, agriculture spend-
ing on agricultural extension workers (also referred to as development agents), 
water sector spending on recurrent costs for water systems, and road spending on 
road maintenance staff. In health, education, and agriculture there is a one-to-one 
correlation between woreda-level block grant spending and HEWs, teachers, and 
agricultural extension workers.
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Box I.1 The Indirect Route of Accountability Through Policy Makers to Service 
Providers
In Ethiopia’s strong push to achieve middle-income status by the mid-2020s, the federal, re-
gional, and woreda governments all assign high priority to attaining development results 
quickly, especially in the basic service sectors. The Ethiopian state has high expectations of 
performance from civil service staff at the decentralized levels of government. These indi-
viduals, who are responsible for moving their communities toward specific development out-
comes, are at the heart of the relationship between policy makers and service providers.
Policymakers operating at the local level are held accountable to their higher-ups, and the 
Ethiopian government expects officials at every level to deliver results. The accountability 
between policy makers and service providers is one of the three sides of the “accountability 
triangle” depicted in the World Development Report 2004. Policy makers have some degree of 
control over providers’ results, and well-intentioned policy makers can put into place the ap-
propriate mechanisms and incentives to drive positive outcomes.
Two elements of Ethiopia’s system influence the degree of accountability and deserve 
note. First, decentralization has created woreda offices that are positions of inherent prestige, 
conferring a certain level of power and influence in the community. To some extent, competi-
tion for these desirable positions leads local authorities to feel responsible for results and to 
remain open to feedback from citizens. Second, the relationship between local policy makers, 
service providers, and the community is strengthened by recruiting individuals locally: Teach-
ers, health workers, and other local residents hired to provide services are apt to feel an intrin-
sic motivation to serve their community.
According the World Development Report 2004, “a critical element in the policymaker-pro-
vider relationship is information.” A woreda’s improvements in the enrollment rate or the pro-
vision of antenatal care, for example, create an impression of the relative success or failure of 
the woreda’s officials. Similarly, knowledge of provider absenteeism enables woreda officials 
to hold specific service providers to account. The financial transparency and social account-
ability components of the PBS Program, as well as efforts to strengthen monitoring, evalua-
tion, and related reporting from each sector, are providing additional opportunities to im-
prove the accountability of service providers.
The PBS Program is the primary means by which the World Bank and other 
development partners assist Ethiopia to achieve the MDGs. At the program’s 
inception in 2006, Ethiopia had just started to register noticeable improvements 
in human development indicators, albeit from low absolute levels. The Project 
Appraisal Document for the first phase of PBS clearly stated the challenge of 
maintaining that nascent progress in the face of political and economic uncer-
tainty: “These gains represent the first steps on a steep development trajectory that 
Ethiopia will need to sustain if it is to have a chance to meet any of the MDGs” 
(World Bank 2012a). Eight years on, it is obvious that through the PBS Program, 
Ethiopia is meeting that challenge, and more. The current five-year third phase of 
PBS costs US$6.4 billion, of which about half is financed by the government.
6 Introduction and Background
Improving Basic Services for the Bottom Forty Percent • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0331-4
Table I.1 shows the evolution of Federal Block Grants (FBGs) provided to the regions by 
the federal government between 2005/06 and 2012/13; Table I.2 shows the evolution of 
Woreda Block Grants (WBGs) provided by the regions to the woredas.
While helping to achieve many of the eight MDGs, the PBS Program focuses principally 
on three—achieving universal primary school education (Goal 2), reducing child mortality 
(Goal 4), and improving maternal health (Goal 5)—and also has a direct impact on the eradi-
cation of extreme poverty and hunger (Goal 1) and the promotion of gender equality 
(Goal 3). The program takes advantage of Ethiopia’s well-developed system of fiscal decen-
tralization, which was well under way when the program began, to channel resources to the 
Table I.1 Federal Block Grants and PBS Program Disbursements
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
Federal Block 
Grants (FBGs)  
to the regions 
(ETB million) 7,071.5 9,365.0 13,532.5 16,554.8 19,555.7 25,555.8 30,576.4 35,555.3
Federal govern-
ment expendi-
tures (Treasury 
source only) 
(ETB million) 21,856.5 26,976.2 34,717.4 41,053.8 53,063.7 67,769.6 83,470.2 89,064.2
FBGs as a share  
of federal 
government 
expenditures 32.4 34.7 39.0 40.3 36.9 37.7 36.6 39.9
PBS donors’ contri-
bution to FBGs 
(US$ million) 91.0 446.7 477.9 437.2 453.9 542.6 329.5 444.5
Average exchange 
rate (ETB/US$) 8.6810 8.7943 9.2441 10.4205 12.8909 16.1081 17.7686 18.1947
PBS donors’ contri-
bution to FBGs 
(ETB million) 790.0 3,928.8 4,417.7 4,556.3 5,851.7 8,741.0 5,855.1 8,087.4
PBS donors’  
contribution  
to FBGs (%) 11.2 42.0 32.6 27.5 29.9 34.2 19.1 22.7
IDA’s contribution 
to FBGs (%) 11.2 9.4 12.4 14.7 14.8 12.9 12.1 9.5
FBGs as a share  
of total regional 
expenditures 76.2 88.5 85.3 86.2 79.8 80.4 62.8 54.4
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development for the data on FBGs and federal government expenditures, PBS donors for data 
on PBS disbursements, and National Bank of Ethiopia for exchange rate data.
Note: ETB = Ethiopian birr; IDA = International Development Association; PBS = Promoting Basic Services.
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Table I.2 Total Woreda Recurrent Expenditures by Region
ETB million
Region 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
Tigray 457.3 556.9 797.6 941.9 1,040.0 1,426.7 1,837.8 2,265.0
Afar 126.9 119.2 191.2 247.9 278.3 371.3 405.5 481.4
Amhara 1,385.4 1,363.1 2,160.2 2,956.2 3,136.5 3,787.2 5,522.7 6,429.4
Oromia 2,056.7 2,109.8 3,070.7 4,312.9 4,401.9 5,866.5 6,957.0 8,887.9
Somali 217.8 232.0 367.2 282.0 459.3 626.9 972.3 1,123.0
Beneshangul-
Gemuz 100.3 124.1 148.2 167.1 216.7 293.1 452.7 488.7
SNNP 1,250.4 1,539.2 1,910.1 2,097.9 3,012.6 3,950.5 5,161.1 6,279.5
Gambella 69.4 84.2 127.8 140.1 151.3 202.1 286.9 351.0
Harari 0.0 24.2 24.2 33.9 38.3 48.8 60.1 73.7
Dire Dawa 0.0 14.4 27.8 28.3 31.7 31.8 41.4 52.2
Addis Ababa 507.2 534.9 656.9 1,187.0 1,178.9 1,447.3 1,922.9 2,581.0
All regions 6,171.3 6,702.2 9,481.8 12,395.1 13,945.3 18,052.0 23,620.3 29,012.9
All regions  
(excluding  
Addis Ababa) 5,664.1 6,167.3 8,825.0 11,208.1 12,766.5 16,604.8 21,697.4 26,431.8
Source: World Bank based on Ministry of Finance and Economic Development data.
woreda level to finance recurrent expenditures and efficiently deliver and 
expand services in the five sectors mentioned earlier. At the local level, this fund-
ing is used to deploy frontline development workers and in this sense is linked to 
meeting MDG targets. HEWs, for example, promote preventive behaviors and 
provide basic health interventions, such as vaccinations and family planning 
information, which serve to reduce child mortality and improve maternal health. 
The hiring of additional teachers is related directly to increasing net enrollment 
rates in order to achieve universal primary education. Funds transferred to the 
woredas in the first two phases of the PBS Program helped to hire more than 
100,000 new primary school teachers, 38,000 HEWs, and 45,000 agricultural 
extension agents, dramatically expanding access to their respective services.
Despite the impressive scale of the PBS Program, prior to this study no 
empirical analysis was done to assess the effects of PBS spending on outcomes, 
partly because of the difficulty of obtaining data on local expenditures and out-
comes over time. One of this study’s signal accomplishments is that it has com-
piled comprehensive expenditure data through time and consolidated it into a 
database with output indicators for health and education for the same time 
period—a prerequisite for the analysis that follows.
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Notes
 1. Appendix C briefly describes the evolution of the modern Ethiopian Federal State.
 2. See, for example, Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972), Besley and Coate (2003), and Faguet 
(2000, 2012).
 3. World Bank (2014). This programmatic knowledge series complements another pro-
grammatic knowledge series in Ethiopia, led by the Poverty Reduction Economic 
Management network, which will include a poverty assessment, public expenditure 
reviews, and various reports on growth and employment.
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A primary objective of this study is to assess the relationship between expendi-
ture at the woreda level to provide basic services in five sectors and key outputs 
and outcomes for those sectors, focusing particularly on health, education, and 
agriculture (for which the best data are available).1 As noted, woreda-level 
spending in those three sectors is associated strongly with key service outputs, 
such as numbers of teachers, health extension workers (HEWs), and agricultural 
extension workers.
This study focuses on such outcomes as the net enrollment rate, rates of vac-
cination and contraceptive use, and agricultural yields of a variety of crops (see 
figure 1.1 for a diagrammatic representation of the Promoting Basic Services 
[PBS] results chain). An important consideration is that the link between 
C H A P T E R  1
Conceptual Framework  
and Methodology
Figure 1.1 Conceptual Model of the Results Chain of PBS Spending
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• Gains in literacy
• Increased life expectancy
• Lower infant mortality
• Increased agricultural
   income 
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spending on staff and results cannot be one to one; service availability and use 
need to be assessed as well. Unfortunately such data are not available for the 
most part, with the very limited exception of the health sector, where 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data show that the use of health ser-
vices, especially by the poor, is catalyzed by HEWs (Wang et al., forthcoming). 
Other caveats concern the quality of the data and local effects of spending out-
side the PBS Program (box 1.1).
A parallel objective of this study is to assess the incidence of local expendi-
tures by wealth quintile, in line with the World Bank’s objective of achieving 
shared growth by targeting the bottom 40 percent. Another objective is to inves-
tigate the allocation of block grants at the woreda level in relation to Ethiopia’s 
constitutional objective of providing additional resources to historically under-
served ethnic groups. A final objective, related to the triangle of accountability 
shown in figure I.1, is to assess the components of the PBS Program that are 
designed to strengthen citizen voice in improving basic services.
This study makes use of a database comprising woreda-level recurrent expen-
ditures and information on outcomes for a variety of health and education indi-
cators at the woreda level between 2008 and 2011. These data are complement-
ed by Agriculture Sample Survey (AGSS) data and information from the 2007 
census on the demographic characteristics of each woreda, including its overall 
Box 1.1 Some Caveats on Interpreting the Results of This Study
Please note that while the results reported in the text are for log-linear regressions, we also 
estimated quadratic and linear regressions in addition to probits. The detailed results are in 
appendix D.
Clearly, the local development results achieved in the sectors studied here are affected by 
spending from other levels of government, such as capital spending and nonsalary recurrent 
costs. Examples include the cost of learning materials (financed separately in education) and 
the costs of facilities above the health center level (financed separately in health). PBS Pro-
gram spending in agriculture and roads includes only spending on extension workers and 
road maintenance staff. In other words, it is important to keep in mind that the results pre-
sented here for PBS spending—in health, for example—show the catalytic effect of health 
extension workers; the contributions of capital spending, spending on medicines, and other 
types of expenditures are taken as given. To cite another example, the results of PBS spend-
ing in agriculture would not be possible without the contribution of other spending, public 
and private, and reflect only the catalytic effects of agricultural extension workers.
Another important caveat is that, as always, the results presented here are subject to the 
quality of the data used in the analysis. The management information systems for health and 
especially education are fairly reliable and improving (not least through PBS support), al-
though much room for improvement remains. Fortunately, the results for health and educa-
tion can be confirmed by national-level analysis of DHS data. The analysis for agriculture uses 
Agriculture Sample Survey data, which are also considered reliable.
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population, ethnic composition, the percentage of the population that is rural 
and urban, and other variables. Econometric modeling is used to assess the asso-
ciation of increased local spending with the expansion of basic services and out-
comes, and by extension the efficiency of the PBS Program in meeting its devel-
opment objective. The study also verifies the woreda-level findings in health and 
education using the household data from DHS 2005 and 2011, including the use 
of limited dependent variable (primarily probit) regressions to predict the impact 
on household behavior of interactions with HEWs.
Cross-time pooled regressions with the log of the outcome variable of interest 
on the left-hand side were run to evaluate the result of the log per capita sector 
expenditure, controlling for shares of rural/urban population and ethnicity (which 
constitute a good proxy for historical lags in development). A variable for time 
was included to isolate the time-series effects from other effects. The main text 
presents results from the log-linear regressions, which are preferred because they 
eliminate the effects of extreme values and allow for declining returns to scale. 
Linear regressions and quadratic regressions were also estimated (see appendix A).
The indicators evaluated are drawn mostly from the PBS Results Framework. 
No reliable data on outcomes at the woreda level were available for agriculture, 
water supply, and roads, so alternative approaches were used. For agriculture, 
zonal data on outcomes were available to assess the effectiveness of spending on 
agriculture, taking the average per capita woreda spending on agriculture as a 
proxy for services offered by agricultural extension workers. More severe data 
constraints for water supply and roads made it necessary to resort to desk reviews.2
Conducting subnational empirical work on Ethiopia involves numerous chal-
lenges and constraints. Relatively little data is collected, the data are often of 
poor quality, and few attempts are made to systematize the results into any 
obviously comparable framework. A few illustrations are telling. Until very 
recently, fiscal data on subnational expenditures in health, education, agricul-
ture, water, and roads were available only for Ethiopia Fiscal Year (EFY) 2003. 
Their geographic identifying codes and names do not match those used for 
census data, in which geographic codes and names vary in unpredictable but 
pervasive ways from fiscal data. The last census counted some 740 woredas, 
zones, and regions, but the fiscal dataset includes more than 850. Consolidating 
these two sources yielded a dataset of 989 subnational units, 250 more than in 
the census.
The analysis consists of three key stages. Stage I follows the approach of 
Faguet (2012) and Faguet and Sánchez (2013), examining the relationship 
between woreda-level spending in each sector (figure 1.2) and results in those 
sectors. Ideally first differences would be used on the outcome left-hand-side 
variables, but the few years of data currently available make this procedure 
impractical. Instead, trends are estimated by placing levels on the left-hand side.
Stage II is an incidence analysis of woreda-level spending by quintile, using the 
wealth quintile breakdown from the DHS survey. Improvements in health and 
education outcomes are allocated to each quintile by pro-rating the expenditure 
increases to each quintile by the improvement in outcomes achieved for that 
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quintile, controlling for the average improvement for all groups.3 The results 
indicator for education was the net enrollment rate, which is directly affected by 
the number of teachers recruited for the woreda. For health, the results indicator 
is an average of four indicators that are affected directly by locally recruited 
HEWs: increased use of contraception, increased rates of immunization, 
increased use of antenatal care, and increased use of skilled birth attendants.
In stage III, limited dependent variable regressions are used to examine the 
link between woreda expenditure and sectoral results for different wealth quin-
tiles4 to estimate probabilities that households will act in a certain manner. This 
three-stage analysis was limited to sectors with reliable data on woreda-level 
results and corresponding household survey data on health and education.
For education, the third-stage test was considered unnecessary because of the 
direct linkage between woreda-level spending, which is mostly for teachers, and 
the net enrollment rate. The third-stage test was needed for health, however, 
because the linkage between spending on HEWs and results is less direct. In that 
case, the link between contact with HEWs and health sector outcomes was 
tested using DHS data.
Given that no output data were available for agriculture at the woreda level, 
the effect of agricultural extension services was analyzed by plot-size quintile. No 
national or local analysis could be done for water supply; a recent national census 
found that the data were unreliable, and in any event the sector accounts for only 
2 percent of woreda-level expenditure. Nor was in-depth analysis possible for 
roads (which account for only 1 percent of woreda-level expenditure).
Figure 1.2 Woreda-Level Expenditure in the Five PBS Sectors, 2011
Roads
expenditure
1%
Water
expenditure
2%
Health
expenditure
17%
Agriculture
expenditure
18%
Education
expenditure
62%
Source: World Bank calculations using data collected from regional and Woreda bureaus of 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.
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Notes
 1. Note that this study does not look at the quality or effectiveness of service delivery, 
however. Phase three of the PBS Program supports the collection of data on service 
delivery indicators for health and education, which will be used in future studies of 
those issues.
 2. Normally, DHS has good water supply data, but definitional changes between the two 
rounds of DHS in Ethiopia have made the water supply data incompatible.
 3. This methodology was adopted because there were no data on direct use of different 
services by quintile. This approach assumes a link between woreda-recruited staff and 
results.
 4. Education and health quintiles were based on DHS quintiles. Quintile estimates for 
agriculture used land-size quintiles.
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Before discussing the effectiveness and equity analyses of woreda-level spending 
to provide basic services, it is important to document how the context of 
accountability is changing in Ethiopia with respect to service provision. 
Mechanisms that enhance financial transparency, increase social accountability, 
and permit grievances to be addressed all strengthen citizens’ capacity to share 
their concerns effectively with service providers and local authorities (box 2.1). 
Note that one element of direct accountability that is not common in Ethiopia 
outside larger urban centers is the market for basic services, because private pro-
viders are concentrated in major centers.
C H A P T E R  2
Citizen Direct Voice and Accountability
Box 2.1 The Direct Route of Accountability—Citizen Direct Voice  
and Accountability Models in Ethiopia
Decentralization brings service providers under the control of local governments and their 
constituents.a Staffing levels and allocations are centrally approved, but personnel are locally 
hired and managed—and in theory more directly accountable to the community. For ac-
countability to occur, however, local residents must be able to understand the issues sur-
rounding service delivery and the options for voicing their concerns. The Promoting Basic 
Services (PBS) Program is testing and in some cases scaling up complementary strategies to 
strengthen citizens’ voice and access to information.
For example, the project’s financial transparency and accountability component 
makes information about local government budgets and spending publicly available in a 
simple, clear format. Through budget literacy training, citizens learn how to provide feedback 
to local authorities on budgets and the provision of basic services.
The project’s social accountability component uses structured social accountability 
tools such as community score cards, citizen report cards, participatory budgeting, and inter-
face (direct) meetings between service providers and service users to make services better, 
more accessible, and more effective. These tools are being used in more than 340 woredas by 
about 4.5 million service users. A rigorous, independent evaluation based on a randomized 
box continues next page
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Decentralization and the Quality and Appropriateness  
of Local Services
Until woreda-level data from the period before decentralization are available, it 
will not be possible to estimate the effects of decentralization per se (in the sense 
of the transfer of expenditure and decision-making authority from upper to 
lower tiers of government) on financial flows, service provision, or substantive 
outcomes. These are the questions on which the decentralization literature typi-
cally focuses, and when data permit, they will be addressed in future reports.
Other, more micro-level questions can be examined with the data assembled 
for this study, however. They concern the effects of woreda-level discretion and 
decision making on the quality of services and their appropriateness to local 
conditions. These questions are distinct from “big discretion” issues, such as how 
to divide resources between investment and expenditure, or how to allocate 
spending between schools, hospitals, and roads. “Small discretion” questions con-
cern such issues as how to target a vaccination campaign, or when and exactly 
how to maintain a road, or which side of a road or stream is the best location for 
a new school. Decisions of this kind, which can increase the efficiency and reduce 
the cost of public services by tailoring services to highly specific local conditions 
and needs, are the bread and butter of local governments.
Small discretion has other important effects on service delivery. Centrally 
established staffing norms determine the local funding available for particular 
sectors, but the actual hiring of staff occurs at the woreda level. Local hiring can 
influence the attendance of teachers, health extension workers (HEWs), and 
agricultural extension workers, because the hiring and paying authority is present 
in the immediate area where they work. Absenteeism is near 50 percent in many 
Box 2.1 The Direct Route of Accountability—Citizen Direct Voice and Accountability 
Models in Ethiopia (continued)
controlled trial is under way to examine the impact of these tools and determine whether 
they should be made available nationally.
The project also plans to strengthen and expand the use of grievance redress mecha-
nisms. A grievance redress mechanism provides the opportunity for an impartial third party 
to review a transaction that has taken place between the government and a citizen or a group 
of citizens, who assert that a government service or benefit has been denied, or some other 
harm has occurred. The Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman (EIO) and the regional Griev-
ance Handling Offices offer these services. The EIO is an independent entity that has six re-
gional branches and is accountable to the Federal Parliament. Grievance Handling Offices, 
established in all nine regional states, examine the validity of citizens’ grievances and find 
ways to rectify them. They are accountable to the respective chief administrator in their re-
gional state and receive technical support and capacity building from the EIO.
a. See Faguet (2004) for an in-depth discussion of the theory surrounding this topic, and Faguet and Wietzke (2006) 
for practical applications.
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countries that centrally recruit and deploy teachers. The limited evidence avail-
able for Ethiopia shows that teacher absenteeism is about 15 percent.1 The same 
study finds that only 10.4 percent of respondents said that health staff were 
frequently absent, including the HEWs who serve the immediate community. 
Nearly all respondents (96 percent) reported that agricultural extension workers 
were present in their kebele (subdistrict), and 95 percent found them to be use-
ful. This is the effect of small discretion. More services are delivered because 
more service providers are on the job, and if they are not, evidence indicates that 
a significant percentage of citizens will complain to their local government about 
it (Kamurase and Alibhai 2014). In sum, the limited data show that decentraliza-
tion increases accountability, and that even if a small number of citizens make 
their voices heard, they can have a positive effect on the quality of service 
delivery.
Ethiopia’s decentralization law also allows citizens from different ethnic or 
language groups to request their own woreda and education in their own lan-
guage. Such actions appear bound to introduce a greater measure of local 
accountability and increase learning effectiveness.
Financial Transparency and Accountability
Over the last five years, financial transparency and accountability (FTA) tools 
designed under the PBS Program have been rolled out to disclose information on 
regional and local budgets, service delivery targets, and accomplishments. More 
than 90 percent of Ethiopia’s woredas and city administrations now post such 
information publicly. Aside from posting information, regions also use radio and 
television programs, brochures, t-shirts, and other means to disseminate informa-
tion. These actions have revolutionized transparency, as this key information was 
not released to the public before 2006.
The increase in transparency has not been even across the country. A recent 
survey (Selam Development Consultants 2013, 34–35) finds that 42.5 percent 
of respondents have seen FTA templates posted in their jurisdictions. It is encour-
aging that citizens are not merely passively receiving this information but are 
responding to it. More than 230,000 citizens across all woredas and city admin-
istrations have received budget literacy training to improve their understanding 
of the budget process and service delivery issues. As a result, over time more citi-
zens are discussing budget and spending priorities with their local officials, pro-
viding feedback on budget execution, and monitoring project implementation. 
The survey mentioned earlier finds that 37 percent of respondents have dis-
cussed budget information with their woreda or city officials. Another 26 percent 
have discussed the information with other citizens. Nor is this communication 
one sided. Some 37 percent of survey respondents indicated that woreda and city 
officials had sought citizens’ views on budgetary issues, and 43 percent revealed 
that officials had also sought citizens’ views on the quality of public services. (See 
appendix B for more detail.)
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Social Accountability
The social accountability component of the PBS Program complements FTA 
initiatives by supporting civil society organizations and other means for citizens 
to provide feedback to local administrators and service providers.2 In an earlier 
phase of PBS, 86 woredas tested tools such as community score cards, citizen 
report cards, and participatory budgeting. They also promoted interface meetings 
between citizens and local authorities to provide feedback on service delivery.
Following a positive evaluation of those pilot efforts, the current phase of PBS 
features an expanded social accountability component.3 The evaluation finds that 
more than 84 percent of the individuals surveyed in pilot areas responded posi-
tively to social accountability initiatives, which had increased citizens’ awareness 
of their rights, responsibilities, and entitlements to basic services. After service 
providers and users drew up joint service improvement plans, basic services 
improved, and so did the quality of the engagement between citizens and service 
providers. These findings bear out the prediction of the model shown in figure I.1.
During the current phase of the PBS Program, participating woredas are con-
tinuing to use the tools piloted in the first phase. Interface meetings between 
users and providers of services, along with woreda and kebele officials, continue 
as well, in addition to the development of agreed joint action plans monitored by 
joint committees of service users and providers. In 224 woredas, 49 Social 
Accountability Implementing Partners are working to assist public service pro-
viders to deliver better-quality services in education, health, agriculture, water 
and sanitation, and rural roads, in response to feedback from communities and 
citizen groups. Other social accountability tools will be considered carefully, 
based on their value added, including participatory planning and budgeting, bud-
get tracking, gender-responsive budgeting, and service charters. (See appendix B 
for details.)
The government is exploring strategies to sustain and strengthen these social 
accountability initiatives. Initial thoughts on such a policy highlight the need to 
strengthen linkages and synergies between social accountability and FTA, evalu-
ate the implementation of recommendations on linkages, and develop more 
medium- and long-term options based on those evaluations.
Grievance Redress Mechanisms
A study conducted under the auspices of the PBS Program in 2011 determined 
that Ethiopia had established several grievance redress mechanisms in different 
regions under various programs (Randolph and Edjeta 2011). The mechanisms 
varied significantly in their legal underpinnings, procedures, the government 
entity to which they were responsible, accountability, and the finality and 
enforcement of grievance findings.
Through dialogue and technical and financial support, the PBS Program aims 
to strengthen the Grievance Handling Offices at the regional state level by 
improving public awareness of the services they provide, delivering technical 
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assistance to develop a common standard of grievance redress procedures, and 
developing the capacity of grievance handling officers. The PBS Program also 
supports the opening of Grievance Handling Offices in all regional states, as well 
as branches of the Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman (EIO). Currently 
the PBS Program finances capacity building and training workshops conducted 
by EIO for regional EIO branch offices and regional grievance handling officers. 
It also supports studies to aid in standardizing and improving the grievance 
redress system across the country. This important contribution supports and 
expands the forums where ordinary citizens can air their concerns.
Notes
 1. Based on initial results from a baseline survey conducted for an assessment of the 
social accountability component of the PBS Program. Data on absenteeism include 
not just absence from school but also absence from the classroom. See Kamurase and 
Alibhai (2014).
 2. Under PBS, social accountability activities are financed through a programmatic mul-
tidonor trust fund administered by the International Development Association (IDA), 
though without IDA resources.
 3. IPE Global (2010). The assessment was not a formal evaluation but relied more on 
recapitulative data. As mentioned, the new phase of PBS was designed to include a 
full, rigorous evaluation, for which a baseline survey has been completed.

   21Improving Basic Services for the Bottom Forty Percent • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0331-4 
A Positive Association between Woreda Block Spending  
and Results in Education
Over half of the resources channeled to local governments under the Promoting 
Basic Services (PBS) Program are used to hire primary school teachers.1 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data indicate that the net enrollment 
rate for primary school climbed from 68 percent to 82 percent between 2005 
and 2011, and the completion rate rose from 34 to 49 percent. The analysis that 
follows sought to determine if there was an association between per capita 
expenditures on primary education at the woreda level and the net enrollment 
rate (NER) and pupil-teacher ratio (PTR). The third phase of the PBS Program 
is expected to achieve specific improvements in both of these education-related 
indicators, which are included in the results framework.
The analysis did not consider nonsalary recurrent costs in education, which 
are covered by other levels of government.2 The exclusion of those costs is not 
expected to affect the results of the analysis to a great extent, given that teacher 
costs constitute more than 90 percent of recurrent costs in basic education. The 
model does consider the impact of capital costs such as school buildings, how-
ever, which can drive enrollments. Capital expenditure is based on per capita 
expenditures at the regional level, where most capital spending occurs. Table 3.1 
presents the main coefficients of interest from the log-linear regression analysis.
Both net enrollment rate and pupil-teacher ratio show a strong and significant 
relationship with woreda-level per capita recurrent expenditure, after controlling 
for the effects of rural/urban percentage and ethnicity. For every additional 
Ethiopian birr (ETB) per capita of woreda education spending, net enrollment 
rate increases by 0.20 percent. These results are all significant at the 1 percent 
level and robust to changes in specification. The results for pupil-teacher ratio 
are similar.
C H A P T E R  3
Effectiveness of Woreda Block Grant 
Spending on Education, Health, and 
Agriculture
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A Positive Association between Woreda Block Grant Spending  
and Results in Health
About 20 percent of PBS Program resources channeled to the local level are used 
in the health sector, mainly to hire frontline health extension workers (HEWs) 
(box 3.1). HEWs do not provide extensive curative services; their assignment is to 
support public health in several important ways. They promote healthy lifestyle 
practices in the community and refer complicated cases, such as difficult pregnan-
cies or severe child malnutrition, to a health center, where they can be treated by 
health professionals with more extensive training. They also provide services that 
can be scheduled periodically, the most important being immunizations, family 
planning (insertion of contraceptive implants), and antenatal care. HEWs also 
mobilize pregnant women to seek care from skilled birth attendants—nurses, 
Table 3.1 Association of Log of Per Capita Education Expenditure with Log of Education 
Outcomes
Independent variable
Dependent  
variable/indicator Coefficient/(SE) Significance
Log of expenditure Log of net enrollment 
rate
0.2757
(.0280)
***
Log of pupil-teacher 
ratio
–0.2229
(.0203)
***
Source: Based on Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Database from 2008 to 2011.
Note: Number of observations is 2,583 for NER and 2,695 for PTR. Standard errors given in parentheses; *** indicates 
significance at 1percent level.
Box 3.1 Ethiopia’s Health Extension Program and Health Extension Workers
The Health Extension Program is an innovative, community-based program to deliver health 
services. The program’s underlying assumption is that health can be enhanced in communi-
ties by raising awareness, diffusing knowledge through training, and creating model families, 
which exemplify sound health practices (completing immunization schedules, for example) 
and can share their knowledge and behavior.
The program has infrastructure and human staffing components. Every village with 5,000 
residents is supposed to construct a health post and recruit two female health extension 
workers (HEWs) from the community. After one year of training in which they learn to imple-
ment 16 health extension packages, these women return to their community as frontline 
health care staff. The 16 packages are as follows:
•	 Disease prevention and control (3):
– Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) 
and other sexually transmitted infections; tuberculosis prevention and control
– Malaria prevention and control
– First aid emergency measures
box continues next page
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•	 Family health (5):
– Maternal and child health
– Family planning
– Immunization
– Nutrition
– Adolescent reproductive health
•	 Health education and communication
•	 Hygiene and environmental sanitation (7):
– Excreta disposal
– Solid and liquid waste disposal
– Water supply and safety measures
– Food hygiene and safety measures
– Healthy home environment
– Control of insects and rodents
– Personal hygiene.
The HEWs’ main task is to increase awareness of disease prevention strategies. They may 
also supervise the intake of medication for tuberculosis and antiretroviral treatment for 
HIV/AIDS, conduct rapid diagnostic tests for malaria and administer malaria drugs, attend 
uncomplicated childbirths, and collect vital statistics; they are not allowed to administer 
antibiotics. A critical aspect of their work is to refer patients to nearby health centers as 
needed.
The Health Extension Program was piloted in five regions in 2002/03, with encouraging 
results. By mid-2008/09, the Federal Ministry of Health had successfully deployed over 
30,190 HEWs throughout Ethiopia. Various evaluations have found the Health Extension 
Program to have very tangible effects on rural people’s awareness of disease prevention, 
family health, hygiene, and environmental sanitation. The program now covers all of the 
country.
Box 3.1 Ethiopia’s Health Extension Program and Health Extension Workers (continued)
health officers, trained midwives, or physicians—whose positions are also funded 
from the local health budget, although they account for a smaller percentage of 
expenditure.
In other low-income countries, decentralized expenditure has been shown to 
improve health outcomes (Faguet and Ali 2009). Does this hold in Ethiopia? 
Woreda spending on health was analyzed with respect to four health-related 
outcomes: the Penta 3 vaccination rate; the percentage of pregnant women who 
receive antenatal care (ANC); the contraceptive acceptance rate (CAR); and the 
percentage of deliveries by skilled birth attendants (DelSBA). The first two out-
comes are included in the results framework for the third phase of the PBS 
Program, while the latter two were included in the framework for the second 
phase. Each outcome is directly related to local spending on health. Control 
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variables included the per capita capital expenditure (at the regional level).3 
Table 3.2 presents the results of the log-linear regressions.
Increased health expenditures by woredas appear to improve the rates of 
Penta 3 vaccination, antenatal care, contraceptive use, and deliveries by skilled 
attendants. All of these results are significant, and all are robust to changes in 
specification. As with education, the model for health considers only per capita 
woreda-level spending on HEWs and health center staff; it does not consider 
nonsalary and capital costs, although clearly they can affect the results presented 
here. For example, HEWs can convince mothers to immunize their children, but 
the vaccines (financed separately from the health workers) must also be 
available.
The indicators included in the model directly reflect the responsibilities of 
HEWs, who account for most of the local recurrent health expenditure. HEWs 
mobilize the community during immunization campaigns. They are the frontline 
providers of antenatal care and the primary spokespersons in the community on the 
importance of contraception in family planning. Technically speaking, HEWs are 
not skilled birth attendants, but their referrals to those professionals influence the 
proportion of women who give birth with the assistance of a skilled attendant.
A smaller percentage of local health expenditure is directed to health centers. 
By federal mandate, each of the 3,000 health centers must be staffed by one to 
three health officers, depending on the characteristics of the host community. 
Each health officer is backed by a team of about four nurses and has at least one 
trained midwife. Each of the indicators assessed here can potentially be influ-
enced by HEWs as well as health center staff, but except for deliveries by skilled 
Table 3.2 Association of Log of Per Capita Health Expenditure with Health Outcomes
Indicator Coefficient/(SE) Significance
Log of expenditure Log of Penta 3 vaccinations −0.0578
(0.0276)
**
Log of Penta 3 vaccinations on 
expenditure lagged one year
0.1116
(.0374)
***
Log of antenatal care 0.0861
(0.0347)
**
Log of contraceptive acceptance 
rate
−0.0064
(0.0410)
NS
Log of contraceptive acceptance 
on expenditure lagged one year
0.1161
(.0491)
***
Log of deliveries by skilled birth 
attendants
0.2669
(0.0747)
***
Source: Based on Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Database from 2008 to 2011.
Note: Number of observations is 1,664 for Penta 3, 2,277 for antenatal care, 2,243 for contraceptive acceptance rate, 
and 2,154 for deliveries by skilled birth attendants. Standard errors given in parentheses; *** indicates significance at 
1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level.
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birth attendants, most of the effects found in the analysis would be expected to 
arise from HEWs. Deliveries by skilled attendants would be influenced more 
equally by HEWs and health center staff.
A Positive Association between Woreda Block Grant Spending  
and Results in Agriculture
Ethiopia relies heavily on agriculture, which accounts for nearly half of gross 
domestic product (GDP) and employs around 80 percent of the population. 
The PBS Program supports agriculture by financing recurrent costs at the 
woreda level, mostly consisting of the costs of employing agricultural extension 
workers. Extension workers are trained to teach community members about the 
benefits of improved farming techniques, such as the appropriate use of 
improved seed and fertilizer, the importance of irrigation and erosion preven-
tion, and other practices. About 20 percent of PBS funds go to the agricultural 
sector.
In agriculture, just as in health and education, expenditure levels increased 
rapidly between 2008 and 2011. Concomitant with this increase, the percentage 
of fields that use extension services has more than doubled. Figure 3.1 shows this 
trend for both variables. The agricultural data presented here and used in much 
of the analysis in the rest of this section are collected by the Central Statistical 
Agency as part of its annual Agriculture Sample Survey (AGSS). This survey 
obtains information from around 45,000 households and includes data from 
500,000 fields in Ethiopia’s nine regions as well as the city-state of Dire Dawa. 
The data are aggregated at the zonal level to be more representative of the 
underlying population.
Figure 3.1 Growth in Extension Services and Woredas’ Expenditure on  
Agriculture, 2008–11
Average agriculture expenditure per capita
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Zonal spending on agriculture significantly affects the use of a variety of 
improved farming techniques, as seen in the result of cross-time pooled 
regressions on AGSS data between 2008 and 2011 (table 3.3). The regres-
sions for agriculture, like those for health and education, control for the per-
centage of the population that is rural and the ethnic composition of the zone. 
For each zone, deviation from the average rainfall (1996–2011) in the current 
and previous year is included as a predictor. In all regressions where an agri-
cultural variable is included on the left-hand side, both the current year’s as 
well as the previous year’s deviation from average rainfall is a significant 
predictor.
Although the effects appear to be relatively small, several aspects of 
improved farming are significantly and positively associated with zonal per 
capita spending on agriculture. For every additional US$1 per capita spent, for 
example, the probability that a field in a given zone will benefit from extension 
services increases by about 0.2 percent (assuming an exchange rate of ETB 20 
to US$1). Coefficients for the use of fertilizer and improved seed are smaller, 
but these practices remain positively and significantly associated with spending. 
In contrast, irrigation is not associated with higher spending. This result may be 
related to the higher capital costs associated with irrigating fields, and it would 
therefore depend more on zonal expenditure in the water sector than in 
agriculture.
Figure 3.2 shows the overall basket of crops produced by private farmers in 
2011 by the amount produced (in quintals). Cereals (including barley, teff, 
wheat, sorghum, maize, oats, and rice) make up almost 75 percent of production. 
A further 15 percent consists of pulses (such as beans, chickpeas, and lentils) and 
root crops (such as potatoes, carrots, and onions). Enset, fruit crops, and coffee, 
which can be grown only in certain geographical areas, represent a smaller pro-
portion of overall production.
Table 3.3 Effect on Farmers’ Use of Extension Services of ETB 1 Per Capita Spending on 
Agricultural Extension Workers
Indicator Coefficient/(SE) Significance
Field using extension services 0.0008
(0.0004)
**
Field using improved seed 0.0002
(0.0001)
*
Field using fertilizer 0.0007
(0.0003)
**
Source: Based on probit models using cross-time pooled AGSS data from 2008 to 2011.
Note: AGSS data aggregated to the zonal level. Number of observations is 191. Controls include current and previous 
years’ deviations from average rainfall (calculated as the average between 1996 and 2011), zonal poverty rate, 
percentage of the zone’s population that is rural, and the ethnic groupings used in previous regressions. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses; ** indicates significance at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level.
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Figure 3.2 Production by Crop, 2011
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Cereals
72%
Pulses
9%
Root Crops
6%
Vegetables 3%
Oilseeds 3%
Enset 3%
Fruit Crops 2% Coffee 1%
Source: World Bank estimates, AGSS, 2011.
Note: “Other” includes hops and chat. The figure does not include sugar, which is not often  
grown on private land.
The overall objective of spending on agriculture is to increase the productivity 
of farmers’ fields (measured by yield, expressed here as the number of quintals 
produced per hectare of cultivated land). Cross-time pooled regressions between 
2008 and 2011, with the log of yield of a specific category of crop (cereals, pulses, 
and so on) as the dependent variable, show strong positive relationships with log 
per capita recurrent agricultural spending and crop yields. Once again, control 
variables included each zone’s percentage of rural population, overall poverty 
rate, the current and past years’ deviation in rainfall from the average, and ethnic 
composition (this last variable helps to account for geographical heterogeneity in 
crop production).
Of the eight categories of crops grown in Ethiopia, five—cereals, vegetables, 
enset, fruit, and coffee, which represent about 85 percent of national agricultural 
production—show a positive and significant relationship with agricultural spend-
ing (table 3.4). These results, combined with the positive effect of spending on 
agricultural extension services, indicate that PBS Program funds play an impor-
tant role in increasing farmers’ productivity. As discussed, that role should be 
viewed as catalytic, because increased productivity also depends on other public 
and private spending, as well as investments in infrastructure, which are not 
reflected in this analysis.
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Notes
 1. Secondary education expenditure is split between the woreda and the region, so it was 
not included in the analysis.
 2. For example, improvements in the quality of education are supported under the 
General Education Quality Improvement Project, funded by the Government of 
Ethiopia, World Bank, DFID, United States Agency for International Development, 
and many others.
 3. As noted in the discussion on methodology, other control variables included the rural/
urban percentage and ethnicity.
Table 3.4 Association of Log of Per Capita Spending on Agricultural Extension Workers 
with Log of Yield
Independent variable
Dependent variable/indicator 
(yield in quintals/ha) Coefficient/(SE) Significance
Log of expenditure Log of cereal yield 0.128
(0.0489)
***
Log of pulse yield −0.020
(0.0645)
NS
Log of root crops yield 0.320
(0.2266)
NS
Log of vegetable yield 0.582
(0.1330)
***
Log of oilseed yield −0.118
(0.1900)
NS
Log of enset yield 2.397
(0.5766)
***
Log of fruit yield 1.790
(0.2669)
***
Log of coffee yield 1.267
(0.2342)
***
Source: Cross-time pooled AGSS data from 2008 to 2011.
Note: AGSS data aggregated to the zonal level. Number of observations: 167 (cereals), 159 (pulses), 152 (root 
crops), 167 (vegetables), 151 (oilseeds), 90 (enset), 162 (fruits), and 137 (coffee). Standard errors given in 
parentheses;  *** indicates significance at 1 percent level; NS is not significant.
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The analyses in the previous sections find that decentralized spending on education, 
health, and agriculture at the woreda level is efficient, contributing positively and 
significantly to major development objectives in each sector. But has that spending 
also been equitable? This section examines several facets of the equity question, 
including the extent to which investments and outcomes may have varied by 
income group, gender, region, or ethnic group. The analysis should shed some 
empirical light on whether decentralized spending on service provision has fur-
thered the government’s objective of shared growth by targeting individuals in the 
two lowest wealth quintiles, and whether it has supported the constitutional objec-
tive of providing additional resources to historically underserved populations.
Woreda Block Grant Spending on Health Improves Outcomes,  
Especially for the Rural Poor
As mentioned, Ethiopia has met the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of 
reducing the mortality rate by two-thirds in children under five years. This 
impressive achievement is due in no small part to rising local health budgets that 
pay for staff who provide the services and promote the behaviors that reduce 
under-five mortality. Similar improvements have been seen for other health indi-
cators. Because Ethiopia conducted its Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 
one year prior to the Promoting Basic Services (PBS) Program and then five years 
into its implementation, the data can reveal how the program may have affected 
individuals grouped by income level and location (in a rural or urban area). As 
most PBS resources flow to rural areas, this breakdown makes it possible to view 
the effects of health extension workers (HEWs) more clearly.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the substantial improvement seen among rural peo-
ple for all six health indicators between 2005 and 2011. It also shows that—in 
the majority of cases—the improvement was greatest among the bottom two 
wealth quintiles.1 Contraceptive acceptance rates rose over 200 percent for the 
bottom two wealth quintiles, more than twice as much as in the top two 
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quintiles. Similarly, for measles vaccination rates, antenatal care, and delivery by 
a skilled birth attendant, the poorest quintile showed the largest improvement. 
All of these outcomes are highly influenced by the presence of health workers in 
the field, which is financed by intergovernmental fiscal transfers (IGFTs) through 
the PBS Program.
The poorest quintiles also saw improvements in child and under-five mortal-
ity, more so than the richest quintile, but to a lesser degree than other quintiles. 
Outcomes for these indicators, unlike those for the other indicators, are particu-
larly susceptible to factors outside the control of local recurrent health expendi-
ture. Food security, nutritional status, and a mother’s education all play a larger 
role than local health spending in driving these outcomes and can have an out-
sized effect among poorer individuals. It is telling that improvements in child 
mortality are larger than improvements in under-five mortality. The implication 
is that services—in the form of the health extension packages offered by HEWs 
(see box 3.1)—target children more than infants.
Figure 4.1 Percent Improvement in Selected Health Indicators Among Rural People 
Between 2005 and 2011, by Wealth Quintile
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Note: ANC = Antenatal care; HEW = health extension worker.
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The probability of improvement in some of these outcomes can be estimated 
based on whether a household has had contact with an HEW (using 2011 DHS 
data on contacts with HEWs). For example, the 2011 survey asked whether a 
“family planning specialist or HEW” had visited the household in the past year. 
As many of the outcomes fit nicely into a binomial response (use of contracep-
tion versus no use of contraception, for instance), it is possible run a probit model 
in which the response to the question about an HEW visit is the right-hand-side 
variable and the left-hand side is either “success” or “failure” in achieving the 
health outcome. This approach assumes that an HEW can deliver multiple mes-
sages per contact, and not (for example) just a message about family planning. 
The model coefficients are then used to determine predicted probabilities for 
each specific outcome.
In fact, a household was more likely to achieve an outcome if an HEW had 
visited (table 4.1). This association holds across all outcomes for urban and rural 
locations, and for three of the four outcomes examined by wealth quintile, 
despite problems related to the small samples for some quintiles.2 For example, 
pregnant women in the poorest rural households were 15 percent more likely to 
receive antenatal care and 12 percent more likely to vaccinate their child against 
measles if they had received a visit from an HEW than if they had not. The richer 
the household, the more likely it was to achieve many of the health outcomes 
examined here, probably because of unobserved factors, the foremost of which 
is probably women’s education.
Table 4.1 Predicted Probabilities for “Successful” Health Outcomes by Place of Residence and Wealth 
Quintile if an HEW Visited the Household in the Past Year
Residence
Income  
quintile
Contraceptive 
use
Measles 
vaccination
ANC with doctor, 
nurse, midwife, 
or HEW
Delivery by  
doctor, nurse, 
midwife, 
or HEW
Urban Total 0.071*** 0.176*** 0.124*** 0.110***
Rural Total 0.094*** 0.144*** 0.107*** 0.017**
Poorest 0.043** 0.115*** 0.148*** NS
Second 0.078*** 0.106** 0.073*** NS
Middle 0.069*** 0.123*** 0.097*** NS
Fourth 0.108*** 0.181*** 0.096*** 0.022*
Richest 0.127** 0.189* 0.130** NS
Source: Based on probit models.
Note: Number of observations varies by quintile, location, and outcome (see appendix A for details); *** indicates significance at 1% level, 
** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. NS is not significant.
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Incidence Analysis of Woreda Block Grant Spending on Health  
and Education
In examining the equity effects of the PBS Program, an important step was to 
analyze the incidence of health and education spending at the woreda level by 
wealth quintile. The most common form of incidence analysis relies on facility and 
service information by income group, but data constraints eliminated that 
approach. Instead, the analysis relied on DHS 2005 and 2011 data. The incidence 
of increase in per capita expenditures in the health and education sectors over 
2005–11 was allocated by quintile based on the ratio of the improvement in 
results in that quintile to the average improvement in results (see appendix A, 
equation [A.4]). For education, one-result variable (net enrollment rate) was con-
sidered, whereas for health, the analysis used an average of the four results that can 
be affected by HEWs (vaccination, contraceptive use, antenatal care, and deliveries 
by skilled birth attendants). Given that the HEW system started between the two 
rounds of the DHS, the data constitute something of a natural experiment on the 
impact of HEWs. As noted, data on the use of HEWs’ services from DHS 2011 
indicate that HEWs have had a proportionately very strong effect on the four 
results just listed, particularly among individuals in the bottom quintiles.
For education, woreda-level spending appears to be pro-poor. The bottom 
40 percent benefited from 56 percent of that expenditure, and the top quintile 
benefited from 13 percent. The incidence of per capita woreda-level spending 
on education was more than 2.5 times higher for the bottom quintile than for 
the top quintile (table 4.2). For health, a similar pattern emerged: 63 percent 
of the health expenditure at the woreda level accrued to the bottom 40 per-
cent, whereas 10 percent accrued to the top quintile.3 For someone in the bot-
tom quintile, the benefit incidence of per capita woreda-level health spending 
was more than three times higher than it was for someone in the top quintile.
A forthcoming study of multiple countries,4 using a standard methodology, 
corroborates the results obtained with the less-orthodox methodology used here. 
It also finds that woreda-level spending (financed through the PBS Program) is 
significantly more pro-poor than overall spending in education and health. 
Specifically, the overall incidence of all public education spending on the bottom 
40 percent was 33 percent (it was 34 percent for health).
Table 4.2 Incidence of Woreda-Level Spending by Wealth Quintile
Bottom 40%  
share (%)
Top 20%  
share (%)
Multiple by which  
bottom quintile 
exceeds top quintile
Education spending 56 13 2.7
Health spending 63 10 3.4
Combined education and 
health spending 58 12 2.9
Source: World Bank estimates based on several sources according to the methodology in appendix A of this book.
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Catalytic Effect of Spending on Extension Services by Plot Size
Does the catalytic effect of spending on agricultural extension services vary by 
plot size? This question was explored using Agriculture Sample Survey (AGSS) 
data grouped by plot-size quintile. Regression analysis was done for each quintile 
to estimate the effect of each birr of spending on agricultural extension services 
on the probability that farmers in that quintile would use improved techniques 
(defined as improved seed, irrigation, or fertilizer).
Table 4.3 clearly shows that agricultural extension spending at the woreda 
level increases the use of improved farming techniques across all plot-size quin-
tiles. The magnitude is relatively low in the bottom quintile, which may reflect 
financial constraints on purchasing inputs and otherwise investing in improved 
techniques. If so, this constraint could be addressed by improving access to rural 
finance.
Gender Equity Analysis for Woreda Block Grant Spending
Another major question related to equity is whether there is a gender bias in 
PBS expenditures on health, education, and agriculture. In health, the answer 
is an obvious yes. Women in the community, along with children, are the pri-
mary focus of outreach by HEWs and benefit from most of the packages they 
deliver (box 3.1). Spending on health by the woredas can also be considered 
pro-woman because so much of that spending is positively associated with 
increasing women’s access to services that have a strong impact on reducing 
maternal mortality—including contraception, antenatal care, and assisted 
deliveries.
A more precise way to answer the gender equity question is to look at the 
association of expenditure with data on results disaggregated by gender, but such 
data are available only for education, and even then only for certain indicators. 
Table 4.4 provides key coefficients for education recurrent expenditure on net 
enrollment rate and net intake rate (NIR) at the primary level, disaggregated by 
Table 4.3 Effect of ETB 1 Spending on Agricultural Extension Workers on Probability of 
Using Improved Farming Techniques, by Plot-Size Quintile, 2011
Plot-size quintile Any improved technique
Smallest and poorest 0.000322***
Second smallest 0.000344***
Middle 0.000524***
Fourth 0.000667***
Largest and richest 0.000818***
Source: Based on probit models using AGSS data.
Note: Cross-sectional data with 303,242 observations (which are plots, not total household land holdings). Standard 
errors given in parentheses; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. NS is not significant.
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gender. The coefficient for female primary school students is slightly higher than 
for males for both the net enrollment and intake rates, but this difference is not 
significant. The important finding here is that there is no negative bias against 
females in expenditure on education, the sector that receives the bulk of PBS 
Program funds.
By contrast, evidence from the agricultural sector implies an apparent bias in 
outcomes (female farmers are less likely to benefit from extension services), 
which was also found in a study by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (Ragasa et al. 2012). The reasons for this bias are not clear, but it could 
reflect a wide range of circumstances, such as a tendency for extension workers 
to target male farmers (87 percent of Ethiopia’s farmer are male), a tendency of 
women farmers to grow crops of different types or quality than those grown by 
men, or a tendency of female farmers to have smaller holdings.
Table 4.5 shows the probability that improved farming techniques will be 
used on a field, disaggregated by the gender of the head of the household. About 
13 percent of fields in the sample are farmed by female-headed households; such 
fields are significantly less likely to benefit from extension services, though the 
effect is relatively small. Again, in interpreting these results, it is important to 
bear in mind that many other factors also influence the adoption of improved 
farming techniques, the sample size for female-headed households is small, and 
the quality of the data could be improved. Further analysis is required to deter-
mine whether extension workers are indeed preferentially targeting fields owned 
by men and to develop policy responses based on the evidence.
Table 4.4 Association of Log of Education Expenditure with Log of Net Enrollment Rate and 
Log of Net Intake Rate, by Gender
Independent variable
Dependent variable/ 
indicator Coefficient/(SE) Significance
Log of expenditure Log of NER grades 1–8, male 0.115
(0.0116)
***
Log of NER grades 1–8, female 0.158
(0.0137)
***
Log of NIR grades 1–8, male 0.390
(0.0240)
***
Log of NIR grades 1–8, female 0.430
(0.0269)
***
Source: Based on Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Database from 2008 to 2011.
Note: Number of observations is 2,583 for NER and 2,464 for NIR; *** indicates significance at 1 percent level. NS is not 
significant. NER = net enrollment rate; NIR = net intake rate.
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Table 4.5 Predicted Probabilities of Improved Farming Techniques Being Used on a Field, 
by Gender of Household Head, 2011
Household head
Probability that an improved  
technique is used on a field
Male 0.000027***
Female −0.000023***
Source: Based on probit models using AGSS data.
Note: Number of observations is 303,242. Standard errors given in parenthesis; *** indicates significance at 1 percent 
level.
Notes
 1. Owing to the small urban population in Ethiopia, the samples for the wealth quin-
tiles contained too few observations to be representative.
 2. For example, only 1,000 deliveries attended by a doctor, nurse, midwife, or HEW were 
reported, making it difficult to obtain reliable estimates when the data were disag-
gregated by wealth quintile.
 3. Thirty-five percent of woreda health and education expenditures accrued to the bot-
tom quintile.
 4. See Woldehanna, Tsehaye, and Hill (forthcoming).
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The Government of Ethiopia has made the development of historically disad-
vantaged groups and areas a priority. Its system of fiscal decentralization trans-
fers funds to local governments based on formulas applied at the federal and 
regional levels, and level of development is a primary element of those formulas. 
The following sections examine the allocation of subnational expenditures by 
geographical area and ethnic group.
Regionally Disaggregated Analysis of Woreda Block Grant Spending
Figure 5.1 is a simple scatterplot of per capita subnational expenditures across 
Ethiopia’s 718 woredas in 2010, in which each woreda is represented by a dot. 
Identification numbers assigned by region are on the x-axis, which naturally 
groups woredas by region, demarcated in red. The dashed yellow line shows the 
average expenditure in Ethiopia across all woreda, at Ethiopian birr (ETB) 183 
per capita.
Most woredas fall into a spending band of ETB 150–250 per capita. The lower 
outliers cluster near this band, whereas some outliers range as high as ETB 1,000 
per capita. Taking ETB 385 per capita, 110 percent above the national average, 
as the cut-off. Table 5.1 provides data on the higher outliers.
Seven of the woredas that spend the most on basic services, including the five 
highest observations nationwide, are in Gambella. More than 50 percent of the 
woredas in Gambella spend more than 110 percent of the national average on 
the basic service sectors, and so do six woredas in Beneshangul-Gemuz, repre-
senting 30 percent of the woredas in that region. Gambella and Beneshangul-
Gemuz are among the regions that historically have been the most economically 
deprived. Another six woredas where per capita spending on basic services is 
higher than the average are in Tigray. Among the much larger regions that have 
dominated government and the economy since the days of the empire, Amhara 
has only two woredas where spending exceeds ETB 385 per capita, and Oromia 
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Figure 5.1 Woreda Total Recurrent Expenditure Per Capita, 2010
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Table 5.1 Woredas Spending More Than 110 Percent of the National Average on Basic 
Services, by Region, 2010
Region No. woredas
No. woredas above 
110% national  
average
Percent of woredas 
above 70% national 
average (%)
Tigray 46 6 13
Afar 30 0 0
Amhara 137 2 2
Oromia 278 6 2
Somali 48 0 0
Beneshangul-Gemuz 20 6 30
SNNP 144 2 1
Gambella 13 7 54
Harari 1 0 0
Dire Dawa 1 0 0
Source: World Bank.
Note: SNNP = Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (Region).
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has six. The observations for the lowest spending levels appear in Amhara, 
Oromia, and Somali. In terms of expenditure per capita, then, the current sys-
tem broadly favors Ethiopia’s historically disadvantaged regions at the expense 
of the historically dominant ones. At the same time, table 5.1 shows that the 
federal system also prioritizes underserved areas in regions with the larger, more 
established ethnic groups, such as the Amhara, Oromo, and Tigrayan. The next 
section looks in greater detail at Woreda Block Grant spending by ethnic group.
Ethnically Disaggregated Analysis of Woreda Block Grant Spending
Ethiopia’s complex history explains some of the regional differences in develop-
ment.1 In the late nineteenth century, areas consisting of today’s Beneshangul-
Gemuz, Gambella, Southern Nations and Nationalities, Afar, Oromia, and Somali 
Regions were brought under the feudal system of the Ethiopian Empire, based in 
the highlands of north-central Ethiopia. Relations between the newly integrated 
areas and the historic center of the empire were troubled. Owing to the structural 
weakness of the center, successive Ethiopian governments did not command 
effective control over the periphery. Similarly, exploitive economic policies pro-
mulgated by the center resulted in visible marginalization and relative underde-
velopment at the periphery of the empire. This dynamic persisted through the 
socialist era. It was not until 1991, when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front came into power, that ethnic federalism took root in Ethiopia.
A primary objective of this new government was to reverse the policy of eth-
nic homogenization and promote “equitable and broadly shared” economic 
growth among all regions. Achieving this objective involved affirmative action in 
the form of increased budget allocations to historically less developed regions. 
Preferential treatment of previously disadvantaged ethnic groups within Ethiopia 
is helping to create a more equitable base for development. The small lagging 
groups appear to be faring well, yet at the woreda level, the largest lagging 
group—the Somali—is not receiving the additional resources per capita war-
ranted by its development status. The reason for this disparity appears to be that 
during the four years covered in this analysis, the Somali Region transferred only 
49 percent of its Federal Block Grant resources to woredas, compared to the 
average of 73 percent for all other regions.2
Ethiopia has 91 registered linguistic groups and 93 registered ethnicities, mak-
ing it impractical to include a full set of dummies for either of those variables, let 
alone both, in the econometric estimations. Most of these language and ethnic 
groups account for less than 1 percent of the population. Given that the five 
largest ethnicities are heavily concentrated in their five home regions, controlling 
for region in the regression models is substantially similar to controlling for eth-
nicity. For that reason, the econometric models focus on smaller ethnic groups, 
particularly a subset of historically disadvantaged groups.
Using demographic data from the 2007 census, the analysis focuses on the 
Nuwer and Anyiwak3 from Gambella. All other ethnicities, representing less than 
1.5 percent of the population, are combined into a separate group (“other small”). 
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Total recurrent expenditure per capita at the woreda level between 2008 and 
2011 is then compared for these categories versus the largest ethnic groupings in 
the country, omitted from the estimations, such as Amhara, Oromo, and Tigrayan. 
Other estimations not reported here substituted linguistic dummies for ethnic 
dummies, with no significant change in the results. Dummies for Ethiopia’s 12 
regions also mirror the main findings with respect to large versus small ethnic/
linguistic groups, and they did not substantially change any of the other findings.
Table 5.2 provides the key results. It shows that ethnicities with a smaller 
proportion of the population receive a larger share of recurrent expenditure, 
particularly the Anyiwak from Gambella, with ETB 770 more per capita than 
larger groups. The Nuwer receive substantially more per capita as well—ETB 
142. As the positive significant coefficient for the “other small” category shows, 
ethnic groups in that category, which are more likely to be at a relative historical 
disadvantage in development, receive a significantly higher proportion of recur-
rent expenditure.
Table 5.2 Selected Ethnicities’ Influence on Total Woreda Recurrent Expenditure Per Capita
Indicator: Ethnic percentage Coefficient/(SE) Significance
Nuwer 141.5
(36.92)
***
Anyiwak 769.5
(43.82)
***
Gemuz 280.3
(39.03)
***
Konso −10.5
(71.85)
NS
Somalia −66.5
(14.26)
***
Afar −0.5
(17.56)
NS
Other small 32.9
(12.94)
**
Historically developed groups (Oromo, Amhara, 
Gurage, Tigray)
24.9
(10.79)
**
Source: Based on Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Database from 2008 to 2011.
Note: “Other small” includes: Agew Awi, Agew Hamyra, Alaba, Argoba, Ari, Arborie, Bacha, Basketo, Bench, Berta, Bodi, 
Brayle, Burji, Bena, Chara, Dasenech, Dawuro, Debase Gewada, Derashe, Dime, Dizi, Donga, Fedashe, Gamo, Gebato, 
Gedeo, Gedicho, Gidole, Goffa, Guagu, Hareri, Hamer, Irob, Kefficho, Kembata, Konta, Komo, Koro, Koyego, Kunama, 
Karo, Kusumie, Malie, Mao, Mareko, Mashola, Mere, Meenite, Messengo, Mejenger, Mossiye, Mursi, Murle, Nao, 
Nyanegatome, Oida, Qebena, Qechem, Qewama, Shekecho, Sheko, Shinasha, Silte, Surma, She, Timebaro, Tsemay, 
Upo, Werji, Yem, Zeyese, and Zelmam; *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%. NS is not significant.
a. Data for Somali woredas may be understated, as some expenditures normally paid by woredas in other regions are 
paid regionally due to security and capacity constraints.
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A central question posed in this study is whether woredas with a high propor-
tion of historically disadvantaged ethnic groups are favored or disfavored by fiscal 
transfers. The higher distributions to such groups reported here indicate that PBS 
Program funding in fact targets their development needs.
Notes
 1. For more details see appendix C.
 2. The average excludes Addis Ababa, a large city where woredas need to do less with 
regard to basic service provision and other development targets. Note that data on 
spending at the woreda level may be understated in Somali Region; some expendi-
tures normally paid by woredas in other regions are paid regionally due to security and 
capacity constraints.
 3. Nuwer is also spelled as Nuer. Note as well that the census spelling for Anyiwak is 
used here; alternative forms include Anuak and Anyiwa, among others.
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The evidence assembled here implies that decentralized spending at the woreda 
level is both effective and pro-poor. The estimates imply that the returns to this 
spending are far from decreasing, which means that Ethiopia has scope to 
increase spending and speed its achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). In agriculture, the impact of decentralized spending could be 
improved by providing better access to rural finance for the poorest producers.
Some caveats are needed with respect to these findings. In education, spend-
ing on materials and other quality drivers is not included in Woreda Block 
Grants. Teachers’ salaries, which are included, usually constitute 80–90 percent 
of education spending. In health, spending in the woredas does not drive the 
results but should be regarded more as a catalyst to increase the effectiveness of 
systemwide spending. The agricultural extension workers supported through the 
Woreda Block Grants play a similarly catalytic role.
Some historically disadvantaged areas are significantly favored under the cur-
rent spending framework. Expenditure is broadly equal across Ethiopia’s wore-
das, with the striking exception of a small number of woredas concentrated in 
the country’s most disadvantaged regions, which receive significantly greater 
resources. Woredas receiving the least resources are concentrated in the more 
developed, historically dominant regions. Four majority-Anyiwak woredas are 
noteworthy for receiving more public resources than all other woredas in the 
nation. At the very least, the additional resources appear to help disadvantaged 
groups catch up.
The lack of data from the period prior to decentralization prevents an analysis 
of the effects of decentralization per se on financial flows, sectoral outputs, or 
substantive outputs. Even so, data gathered at the woreda level as decentraliza-
tion unfolds can contribute to the debate about the effectiveness of woreda-
controlled service provision. Based on the data available to date, this study finds 
that contrary to the predictions of some public management theories, the decen-
tralized provision of services in Ethiopia is not increasing regional, ethnic, or 
gender inequalities in investment inputs or service outputs. Indeed, the opposite 
seems to be true for education and health, where the impact of Promoting Basic 
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Services (PBS)-financed intergovernmental fiscal transfer (IGFT) resources was 
disproportionately high among the bottom two quintiles and women. In sum, 
support for decentralized services in Ethiopia appears to be an effective use of 
development partners’ resources from both an efficiency and equity 
perspective.
The only exception to these findings is agriculture, for which the impact of 
PBS-financed IGFT expenditure was smaller for the bottom quintile. In this 
instance, a wide array of factors is likely to be at work, especially poor farmers’ 
inability to buy inputs or the poor quality of their land.
Although quantitative evidence is unavailable at present, descriptive evidence 
from the first phase of the Ethiopia Social Accountability Program implies that 
structured feedback sessions involving citizens and service providers are strength-
ening citizens’ participation in pilot areas. That evidence, together with the 
strong guidance emerging from governance and accountability theory, would 
appear to favor the continued application of social accountability tools and the 
development of policies to sustain their use in the Ethiopian context. This con-
clusion will be verified when the impact assessment for the second phase of the 
Ethiopia Social Accountability Program becomes available (the only data avail-
able now are from the baseline survey).
A final important point is that the difficulty of conducting subnational empiri-
cal work on Ethiopia cannot be overstated. Creating the database for this study 
required considerable effort and improvisation on the part of the research team. 
The resulting standardized database of woreda-level expenditures and character-
istics, which will be made public, is a major output of this study. The data will be 
augmented with new data collected under the third phase of the PBS Program 
and used in future research related to the program. It is hoped that in time this 
dataset will become a useful tool for researchers and students elsewhere in Africa 
and beyond.
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A p p e n d i x  A
Methodology
This study relies on a database of woreda-level recurrent expenditure and out-
come information for a variety of health and education indicators between 2008 
and 2011. The data are complemented by information from the 2007 census on 
the demographic characteristics of each woreda, including population, shares of 
population by ethnic group and by rural or urban residence, and other variables. 
Econometric modeling is used to assess the impact of increased local spending 
on the expansion of basic services and outcomes, and by extension the efficiency 
of the PBS Program in meeting its development objective.
Cross-time pooled regressions with the outcome variable of interest on the 
left-hand side were run to evaluate the impact of per capita sector expenditure, 
controlling for rural/urban percentage and ethnicity, over the four years. The 
outcome indicators evaluated are mostly drawn from the Promoting Basic 
Services (PBS) Results Framework. No reliable outcome data at the local level 
could be gathered for agriculture, water supply, or roads, however, so alternative 
approaches were used (zonal data on outcomes for agriculture, and desk reviews 
for water supply and roads). Note that expenditure on water supply and roads 
accounts for 3 percent of woreda-level spending; agriculture, education, and 
health, which are fully analyzed, account for the remaining 97 percent. National 
surveys (DHS [Demographic and Health Survey] and Agriculture Sample 
Survey [AGSS]) complement the analysis from the woreda-level database.
The analysis proceeded in three stages. Stage I follows the approach of Faguet 
(2012) and Faguet and Sánchez (2013), examining the relationship between 
woreda-level spending (a proxy for service delivery, as discussed in the main 
text) in each sector on results in those sectors. That is,
 lnOmt = α + ζlnEmt + βRm + δCm + ηlnKmt + τt + εmt (A.1)
where lnO is different outcome variables, such as the net enrollment rate or use 
of antenatal care, capturing key outcomes in each sector; E is yearly expenditure 
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per capita in the relevant sector; K is capital expenditure per capita; R is the 
percentage of rural population in each woreda; τ is a variable for the year to 
control for the time-series effect in this cross-time pooled dataset; and C is a 
vector of demographic controls, capturing the percentage of certain historically 
disadvantaged ethnic groups that are the focus of the analysis—all indexed by 
woreda m and, for expenditure, by year t. R and C are taken from the census and 
do not change over time. The above was also estimated using the quadratic form 
to check for decreasing marginal returns.
Omt = α + ζEmt + λEmt2 + βRm + δCm + ηKmt+τt + εmt (A.2)
As Yang (2012, 1) indicates:
Interpreting the results of an analysis with log transformed data may be challeng-
ing…. A log transformation is often useful for data which exhibit right skewness 
(positively skewed), and for data where the variability of residuals increases for 
larger values of the dependent variable. When a variable is log transformed, note 
that simply taking the anti-log of your parameters will not properly back transform 
into the original metric used. To properly back transform into the original scale we 
need to understand some details about the log-normal distribution. In probability 
theory, a log-normal distribution is a continuous probability distribution of a ran-
dom variable whose logarithm is normally distributed.
Finally, a linear version was also tested.
Omt = α + ζEmt + βRm + δCm + ηKmt +τt + εmt (A.3)
For all three equations, it is expected δO/δE≥0 and δO/δK≥0. Similarly, δlnO/
δlnE≥0 (the first partial derivative), while in equation (A.2) δ2O/δ2E≤0 (the sec-
ond partial derivative). The expected results imply a positive association of the 
dependent variable with the independent variable (per capita woreda expendi-
tures in the sector). Equation (A.2) also tests whether the association is positive 
with a declining marginal impact.
The form estimated in equation (A.2) allows us to verify if the returns to scale 
are declining. The form in equation (A.1) reduces the effect of extreme values 
on the results.
Stage II conducts an incidence analysis of woreda-level spending by quintile, 
using the wealth quintile breakdown from the DHS survey. The incidence analy-
sis was done by allocating improvements in health and education outcomes to 
each quintile by pro-rating the expenditure increases to each quintile by the 
improvement in outcomes achieved for that quintile, controlling for the average 
improvement for all groups. That is,
ΔEi = (ΔIi/ΔI)*ΔE (A.4)
where ΔEi is the per capita increase in expenditure for quintile i, ΔE is the overall 
increase in expenditure per capita, ΔIi is the change in outcome change for quin-
tile i, and ΔI the outcome change for all quintiles. The results indicator for 
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education was the net enrollment rate, which is directly affected by teachers 
recruited locally by the woreda. For health, the results indicator is an average of 
four indicators that are directly affected by locally recruited HEWs: increased use 
of contraception, increased rates of immunization, increased use of antenatal 
care, and increased use of skilled birth attendants.
Stage III examines the link between woreda expenditure and sectoral results 
for different wealth quintiles, using DHS household survey data and limited 
dependent variable estimations as follows:
Pi,j = f (Ѳ, α) (A.5)
In equation (A.5), Pi,j is the probability of improvement for household j in quin-
tile i, and α indicates whether the household has had contact with a health 
worker. Ѳ is a “yes” or “no” variable, with “yes” being coded 1 and “no” coded 0.
This three-stage analysis was limited to sectors with reliable data on woreda-
level results and corresponding household survey data on health and education. 
In the case of education, the third-stage test was not considered necessary due 
the direct linkage between woreda-level spending, which is mostly for teachers, 
and the net enrollment rate. It was needed for health, however, because the link-
age is less direct. Woreda-level spending is on HEWs; therefore, the link between 
contact with health extension workers (HEWs) and health sector outcomes was 
tested using DHS data. As discussed in the main text, data limitations prevented 
incidence analysis for agriculture, but the effect of agricultural extension services 
was analyzed by plot-size quintile. No in-depth analysis was possible for water 
supply or roads.
The poverty and Social impact Analysis database
The database constructed for this study includes data from five ministries—
Health, Education, Agriculture, Water and Energy, and Finance and Economic 
Development—as well as the Central Statistical Agency and the Disaster Risk 
Management and Food Security Sector of the Ministry of Agriculture. It also 
includes woreda-level poverty rates calculated by the Central Statistical Agency 
with World Bank technical assistance. As standardization of woreda codes and 
the transliteration of Amharic names into Latin script is not yet consistent across 
ministries, much time was dedicated to presenting information on woredas from 
various sources in one consistent format, based on the Population and Housing 
Census of Ethiopia (2007) codes.
The woreda database includes information on expenditures by sector and 
year; key results for health and education; and information on ethnicity, the fre-
quency of droughts, and other control variables. In addition, regional data on per 
capita capital expenditures and zonal data on crop yields have been linked to the 
woreda data. The plan is to update the database yearly, incorporating new results 
for each sector as they become available, and adding other useful data, such as 
local-level capital expenditure through time. The database has already been 
revised to incorporate education data broken down into grades 1–4 and 5–8, 
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which were not available for the analysis presented here. Other researchers are 
invited to supplement the database with data collected as part of their own 
research programs. The analysis of these data is a public good, and they should be 
publicly available for researchers in Africa and elsewhere. Table A.1 lists variables 
in the database along with the corresponding administrative levels and years.
Table A.1 Variables in the poverty and Social impact Analysis database, by Administrative Level
Sector Variable Administrative level Years
Demographic Population: Total Woreda, zone, region 2007
Population: Urban Woreda, zone, region 2007
Population: Rural Woreda, zone, region 2007
Religiona Woreda 2007
Mother tongueb Woreda 2007
Ethnicityc Woreda 2007
Expenditure Approved recurrent budget: Agriculture, Education, 
Health, Water
Woreda 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Adjusted recurrent budget: Agriculture, Education, 
Health, Water
Woreda 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Annual recurrent expenditure: Agriculture, 
Education, Health, Water
Woreda 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Over/under recurrent expenditure: Agriculture, 
Education, Health, Water
Woreda 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Capital expenditure Region 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Meteorological Number of years of drought between 1974 and 2007 Woreda NA
Deviation from average rainfall between 1986 and 
2011
Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Average rainfall between 1986 and 2011 Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Poverty Poverty rate Woreda, zone 2011
Standard error of poverty rate Woreda 2011
Gini coefficient Woreda, zone 2011
Depth of poverty Woreda, zone 2011
Significantly poorer than average Woreda 2011
Water and  
sanitation
Safe water access
Latrine access
Woreda, zone
Woreda, zone
2011
2011
Safe water usage Woreda, zone 2011
Safe water access at health facilities Woreda, zone 2011
Safe water access at schools Woreda, zone 2011
Any latrines at schools Woreda, zone 2011
Improved latrines at schools Woreda, zone 2011
table continues next page
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Sector Variable Administrative level Years
Education Gross enrollment rate: Grades 1–8, total Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Gross enrollment rate: Grades 1–8, male Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Gross enrollment rate: Grades 1–8, female Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Gross enrollment rate: Grades 1–4, total Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Gross enrollment rate: Grades 1–4, male Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Gross enrollment rate: Grades 1–4, female Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Gross enrollment rate: Grades 5–8, total Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Gross enrollment rate: Grades 5–8, male Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Gross enrollment rate: Grades 5–8, female Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net enrollment rate: Grades 1–8, total Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net enrollment rate: Grades 1–8, male Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net enrollment rate: Grades 1–8, female Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net enrollment rate: Grades 1–4, total Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net enrollment rate: Grades 1–4, male Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net enrollment rate: Grades 1–4, female Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net enrollment rate: Grades 5–8, total Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net enrollment rate: Grades 5–8, male Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net enrollment rate: Grades 5–8, female Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net intake rate: Grades 1–8, total Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net intake rate: Grades 1–8, male Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Net intake rate: Grades 1–8, female Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Apparent intake rate: Grades 1–8, total Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
table continues next page
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Sector Variable Administrative level Years
Apparent intake rate: Grades 1–8, male Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Apparent intake rate: Grades 1–8, female Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Primary schools Woreda 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Pupil-teacher ratio Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011
Section-student ratio Woreda 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Dropout rate: Grade 1, total Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 1, male Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 1, female Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 2, total Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 2, male Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 2, female Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 3, total Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 3, male Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 3, female Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 4, total Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 4, male Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 4, female Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 5, total Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 5, male Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 5, female Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 6, total Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 6, male Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 6, female Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
table continues next page
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Sector Variable Administrative level Years
Dropout rate: Grade 7, total Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 7, male Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Dropout rate: Grade 7, female Woreda 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Repetition rate: Grades 1–8, total Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Repetition rate: Grades 1–8, male Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Repetition rate: Grades 1–8, female Woreda, zone, region 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010
Health Number of health posts Woreda 2011
Number of health centers Woreda 2011
Contraceptive acceptance rate Woreda 2008, 2010, 2011
Antenatal care Woreda 2008, 2010, 2011
Deliveries by skilled birth attendants Woreda 2008, 2010, 2011
Prevention of mother-to-child transmission tested Woreda 2008, 2010, 2011
Penta3 vaccination rate Woreda 2008, 2010, 2011
Measles vaccination rate Woreda 2008, 2010, 2011
Fully immunized rate Woreda 2008, 2010, 2011
Tuberculosis detection rate Woreda 2008, 2010, 2011
Tuberculosis treatment rate Woreda 2010, 2011
Tuberculosis cure rate Woreda 2010, 2011
Agriculture Total cultivatable area (hectares) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Total production (quintals) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Number of fields Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Source of irrigationd Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Number of fields irrigated Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Number of fields using extension services Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Number of fields using fertilizer Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Number of fields using improved seed Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Cereals: Area cultivated (hectares)e Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Cereals: Production (quintals) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Pulses: Area cultivated (hectares) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
table continues next page
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Sector Variable Administrative level Years
Pulses: Production (quintals) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Oilseeds: Area cultivated (hectares) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Oilseeds: Production (quintals) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Vegetables: Area cultivated (hectares) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Vegetables: Production (quintals) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Root crops: Area cultivated (hectares) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Root crops: Production (quintals) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Fruit: Area cultivated (hectares) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Fruit: Production (quintals) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Coffee: Area cultivated (hectares) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Coffee: Production (quintals) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Chat: Area cultivated (hectares) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Chat: Production (quintals) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Enset: Area cultivated (hectares) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Enset: Production (quintals) Zone 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011
Source: World Bank. Data sources for variables include: Annual Agriculture Sample Surveys, Central Statistical Agency, 2008–11; Education 
Management Information System Administrative Data, Ministry of Education, 2007–11; Ethiopia Demographic and Health Surveys, 2005 
and 2011; Health Management Information System administrative data, Ministry of Health, 2007–11; Poverty Map with woreda and zonal 
poverty rates, Central Statistical Agency, 2012; Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia (using 10 percent sample), Central Statistical 
Agency, 2007; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Census, Ministry of Water and Energy, 2012; Woreda Annual Progress Reports, Ministry 
of Health, 2007–11; and woreda-level recurrent expenditures in basic services, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2007–11.
a. Orthodox, Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Traditionalist, and other.
b. Afarigna, Agew Awinigigna, Agew Kamyrigna, Alabigna, Amarigna, Anyiwakgna, Arbogigna, Arigna, Arborigna, Bachagna, Basketigna, 
Benchigna, Bertagna, Bodigna, Brayligna, Burjigna, Benagna, Charigna, Dasenechgna, Dawurogna, Debosgna, Derashigna, Dimegna, 
Dizigna, Dongigna, Demegna, Felashigna, Fedashigna, Gamogna, Gebatogna, Gedeogna, Gedichogna, Gedoligna, Goffigna, Gumuzigna, 
Guragiegna, Guagugna, Hadiyigna, Hareriegna, Hamerigna, Irobigna, Kefficho, Kembatigna, Kontigna, Komigna, Konsogna, Koregna, 
Koygogna, Koyrigna, Kunamigna, Karogna, Kusumegna, Maliegna, Maogna, Marekogna, Mashiligna, Merigna, Me’enigna, Messengogna, 
Mejengerigna, Mossigna, Mursygna, Murlegna, Naogna, Nuwerigna, Nyangatomigna, Oromigna, Oydigna, Qebenigna, Qechemigna, 
Qewamigna, Shekacho, Shekogna, Shinashigna, Sidamigna, Shetagna, Somaligna, Surmigna, Shegna, Tigrigna, Timbarogna, Tsemayigna, 
Welatigna, Wergigna, Yemsagna, Zeysegna, and other.
c. Affar, Agew Awi, Agew Hamyra, Alaba, Amara, Anyiwak, Argoba, Ari, Arborie, Bacha, Basketo, Bench, Berta, Bodi, Brayle, Burji, Bena, 
Chara, Dasenech, Dawuro, Debase Gewada, Derashe, Dime, Dizi, Donga, Fedashe, Gamo, Gebato, Gedeo, Gedicho, Gidole, Goffa, Gumuz, 
Guragie, Guagu, Hadiya, Hareri, Hamer, Irob, Kefficho, Kembata, Konta, Komo, Konso, Koro, Koyego, Kunama, Karo, Kusumie, Malie, Mao, 
Mareko, Mashola, Mere, Meenite, Messengo, Mejenger, Mossiye, Mursi, Murle, Nao, Nuwer, Nyanegatome, Oromo, Oida, Qebena, 
Qechem, Qewama, Shekecho, Sheko, Shinasha, Sidama, Silte, Somali, Surma, She, Tigrie, Timebaro, Tsemay, Upo, Welaita, Werji, Yem, 
Zeyese, Zelman, and other.
d. River, lake, pond, harvesting, other.
e. Yield for each type of agricultural product is the quotient of its production and area.
Table A.1 Variables in the poverty and Social impact Analysis database, by Administrative Level (continued)
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The World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People advo-
cated transparency and accountability mechanisms as effective tools for increas-
ing the effectiveness of development projects focused on service delivery. 
Accordingly, when the Promoting Basic Services (PBS) program started its first 
phase in 2006, it included a financial transparency and accountability (FTA) 
component that provided approximately US$11 million to promote the disclo-
sure of budget information to the general public at the local level. It also includ-
ed a social accountability component that provided about US$6 million to pilot 
innovative methods of improving citizens’ knowledge of their rights and respon-
sibilities with respect to public service delivery. Social accountability activities 
were implemented through civil society organizations operating where the pilots 
were located.
The government’s initial unfamiliarity with FTA meant that activities were 
implemented slowly at first, but with additional support, four prototype FTA 
tools were developed, validated, and disseminated to regions by the end of the 
program’s first phase. These tools included laypersons’ guides to the budget pro-
cess and three templates for disseminating information on the budget and expen-
ditures at local level.1 The baseline FTA Perceptions Survey was completed in 
June 2009.
Social accountability activities reached 80 woredas (approximately 12 per-
cent of the country) under the first phase of the program. Activities focused on 
four basic service sectors: education, health, agriculture, and water and sanita-
tion. The 12 civil society organizations engaged for this work used internationally 
proven best practices that were new to Ethiopia (the human rights-based 
approach to development, community score cards, citizen report cards, and par-
ticipatory budgeting) as well as focus group and interface discussions and partici-
patory planning and monitoring. Although the activities were new to most of the 
participating organizations, the program achieved its expected outcomes (the 
adoption of social accountability best practices and the creation of a learning 
initiative among participating citizens).
Financial Transparency and Social 
Accountability under the PBS Program
A p p e n d i x  B
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Given the potential demonstrated by the FTA and social accountability initia-
tives in phase one, phase two included substantial resources for their scaling up 
and institutionalization. Regions started posting their budget appropriations to 
woredas on their websites. The FTA tools developed in phase one were extended 
to all regions, translated to regional languages, customized for local conditions in 
other ways, and disseminated to woredas. Budget literacy training, which had 
reached 1,500 individuals under the first phase, was expanded to reach 171,017. 
More generally, FTA was institutionalized in the public finance system. By the 
end of the second phase, approximately 94 percent of woredas were posting 
budget and expenditure data using the customized templates, and 53 percent of 
service facilities on average used the service delivery templates. Forty-three per-
cent of citizens confirmed that woreda officials had sought their views concern-
ing the quality of basic public services. The percentage of citizens reporting 
knowledge of the woreda budget increased from 13 percent in 2008 to 20 per-
cent in 2011.
The scaled-up social accountability component for phase two was based on 
findings from an independent evaluation of the pilot. A key difference in the 
second phase was the shift away from individual service facilities to a sectoral 
approach that engaged institutions and key actors in the community under a 
more comprehensive strategy. Activities were piloted in 86 woredas, in collabora-
tion with 45 civil society organizations, with strong results. Community mem-
bers received training, tools, and other mechanisms to assess service delivery and 
budget use and develop joint action plans with service users to improve the 
quality of services.
Building on that foundation, FTA activities (budgeted at almost US$12.5 mil-
lion) under the third phase of PBS focus on improving the quality of budget and 
expenditure information provided to the public by refining and simplifying the 
FTA tools. Continued budget literacy training will expand the awareness of bud-
get processes and issues among citizens and woreda and kebele council members. 
The program will engage with other sectors to institutionalize FTA by disclosing 
their budget and service information to citizens. Social accountability activities 
(budgeted at US$20.5 million under phase three) will be extended to 170 wore-
das, bringing the total number of woredas with such activities to 344, represent-
ing about 4.5 million service users. Impact will be measured through a random-
ized controlled trial. Existing methodologies will be refined, and new social 
accountability tools will be carefully considered based on their value added, 
including participatory planning and budgeting, budget tracking, gender-respon-
sive budgeting, and service charters. Overall, the progression of FTA and social 
accountability activities under the PBS Program has brought about much greater 
transparency and accountability in publicly provided basic services.
note
 1. Citizens did not use the tools in the program’s first phase, but the groundwork was 
laid for their use.
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Ethiopia’s ethnic composition reflects its turbulent history. During the medieval 
period, Ethiopia primarily comprised the Tigray, Agaw, and Amhara peoples. 
Menelik II’s ascension to the throne in 1889 initiated a period of territorial 
expansion, radiating from the province of Shoa in present-day Amhara Region. 
The areas now known as Beneshangul-Gemuz, Gambella, Southern Nations and 
Nationalities, Afar, Oromia, and Somali Regions came under the Ethiopian 
Empire’s feudal system. After the Battle of Adwa in 1896 and Europe’s recogni-
tion of Ethiopian statehood, border treaties were concluded with the surround-
ing colonial powers, and the modern Ethiopian state was born.
A Legacy of Troubled Relations between the Center and periphery
Relations between the newly integrated areas and the historic center of the 
empire were troubled. Menelik sent governors from the center to administer the 
new territories, but owing to the center’s structural weaknesses, successive 
Ethiopian governments did not effectively control those areas. Exploitive eco-
nomic policies imposed on those areas led to their visible marginalization and 
relative underdevelopment, and resulted in limited integration among the border 
regions within Ethiopia (Mulugeta 2002).
Yet the center tightened its hold over the periphery. According to noted his-
torian Bahru Zewde, “The period after 1941 witnessed the apogee of absolutism. 
The tentative beginnings in this direction of the pre-1935 years matured into 
untrammeled autocracy. The power of the state reached a limit unprecedented 
in Ethiopian history” (Zewde 1991). The revised constitution of 1955 solidified 
the absolute powers of the emperor, claiming “His dignity…inviolable and His 
power…indisputable.” It also entrenched Amharic as the sole official language 
and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church as the national religion.
The Center and the Periphery in 
Ethiopia: The Evolution of Today’s 
Federal State
A p p e n d i x  C
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Socialist rule (1974–91) did not diminish the center’s hold over the periphery or 
change the prevailing economic policies of exploitation. Despite the regime’s appeal 
to a socialist ideology, the Derg was identified with an “Amhara suppressor” by the 
nationalist liberation movements (Weldemariam 2011). Any conduct promoting 
ethnic individualism, and thereby challenging the state’s integrity, was outlawed.
The 1991 victory of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
over the Derg reversed more than one hundred years of ethnic homogeniza-
tion. As Christopher Clapham says, “The overthrow of the Mengistu govern-
ment in May 1991 amounted to more than the collapse of a particular regime. 
It effectively marked the failure of a project, dating back to Menelik’s accession 
in 1889 of creating a ‘modern’ and centralized Ethiopian state around a Shoan 
core” (Clapham 1994).
Ethnic federalism now came to the fore in the Transitional Charter, which 
allowed the right to self-determination for the country’s various “nations and 
nationalities.” Like the Transitional Charter, the new constitution of 1995 recog-
nized the rights of ethnic self-determination up to secession. It also created a 
federal government with nine regional states divided along ethno-linguistic lines: 
Tigray; Afar; Amhara; Oromia; Somali; Beneshangul-Gemuz; South Nations, 
Nationalities, and Peoples; Gambella; and Harari (table C.1).
Table C.1 ethiopian Regional population distribution and ethnic Composition
Region Population
Estimated size in 
square kilometers Ethnic composition (%)
Tigray 4,316,988 50,078 96.6 Tigray, 1.6 Amhara, 1.8 others
Afar 1,390273 96,707 90.0 Afar, 5.2 Amhara, 1.6 Argobba, 1.2 
Tigray, 2.0 others
Amhara 17,221,976 159,173 91.5 Amhara, 4.9 Agaw, 2.6 Oromo, 1.0 
others
Oromia 27,158,471 353,006 87.8 Oromo, 7.2 Amhara, 0.9 Gurage, 
4.1 others
Somali 4,445,219 279,252 96.2 Somali, 2.3 Oromo, 0.7 Amhara, 
0.8 others
SNNP 14,929,548 112,343 19.4 Sidama, 10.6 Welayta, 8.0 Hadiya, 
7.5 Gurage, 7.0 Gamo, 5.4 Kafficho, 
5.4 Silt’e, 36.7 others
Gambella 307,096 25,802 47.3 Nuer, 21.7 Anyiwak, 8.0 Amhara, 
5.2 Opo and Komo, 4.4 Majangir, 
13.4 others
Beneshangul-
Gemuz
784,354 49,289 25.4 Berta, 21.7 Amhara, 20.9 Gemuz, 
13.6 Oromo,
7.7 Shinasha, 4.2 Agaw-Awi, 6.5 others
Harari 183,415 311 56.4 Oromo, 22.8 Amhara, 8.7 Harari, 
4.4 Gurage, 3.9 Somali, 1.5 Tigray, 
2.5 others
Source: Data from 2007 census conducted by the Central Statistical Agency.
Note: SNNP = Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (Region).
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A primary focus of the new government was economic integration and equi-
table development. As Meles Zenawi, President of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, declared in 1997, “It is only through fast economic growth 
that is broadly shared by the population that we can hope for sustainable peace. 
And, therefore, one of the most important pillars of our program is fast economic 
growth that is equitable and broadly shared among the population” (Meles 1997).
The government adopted a policy of affirmative action toward historically 
disadvantaged regions, whereby Beneshangul-Gemuz, Gambella, Afar, and 
Somali would receive preferential treatment in budget allocations and enrollment 
in higher education. Centralization’s legacy is that developing regions are not yet 
fully integrated into the economy of the Ethiopian state, and few of their resi-
dents participate in running the regional administrative structures. The gradual 
emergence of local administrative officials in the regions, establishment of a more 
equitable base for development, and better investment in education, health, 
social and physical infrastructure, and other areas all attest to the positive out-
comes of Ethiopia’s federalization and affirmative action policy (Adegehe 2009).
The Modern ethiopian Federal State
Decentralization of political, administrative, and fiscal authority to regional and 
local governments has been fundamental to the affirmative action strategy. The 
Government of Ethiopia’s strong commitment to decentralization and building 
a federal state is enshrined in the 1995 Federal Constitution. Decentralization 
should be seen as a work in progress, in which the underlying institutional 
arrangements for success are evolving and continue to require focused support.
The first wave of decentralization occurred during the transitional period 
(1991–94) as state powers devolved to geographically defined ethno-linguistic 
groups and legislation was passed to create regional and woreda (district) councils. 
As needed, regions could establish zones as intermediaries between regional and 
district administrations. In addition to gaining the right to self-determination, the 
new regional units assumed a range of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. 
Within their borders, they exercised jurisdiction over social and economic devel-
opment as well as basic service delivery. Regions were mandated to create the 
internal institutional arrangements to perform those functions, including a coun-
cil, executive committee, judicial administration office, public prosecution office, 
audit office, police and security office, and service and development committee.
Proclamation No. 7/1992 stipulated the sources of revenue for regional gov-
erning units, which included tax revenues derived within their jurisdictions, fiscal 
transfers from the central government, domestic borrowing, and others. The lat-
ter category was specified in Proclamation No. 33/1992. Capacity constraints 
prevented regional governments from performing their revenue-collecting 
assignments, however, and they remained highly dependent on central govern-
ment grants to meet their new spending obligations in the social sectors.
Despite these rather elaborate governing arrangements, the new regional gov-
ernments remained subordinate to the central government. The regional councils 
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were accountable to citizens living within their regional borders, yet legally they 
were also responsible to the central government’s Council of Representatives.
Promulgation of the 1995 Federal Constitution signified another stage in 
Ethiopia’s decentralization. The constitution affirmed the roles and functions of 
federal versus regional government. The federal government was still charged 
with a broad range of functions and responsibilities (such as fiscal and monetary 
policy and international trade), but the regions and woredas gained responsibility 
for ensuring the delivery of basic services in their respective jurisdictions. The 
federal government retained authority to set policies and standards in each of the 
major social service delivery sectors. In 2002, decentralization was extended to 
the woreda governments, which became largely responsible for service delivery. 
Woredas receive block grants from their respective regional governments; the 
size of Woreda Block Grants is determined by formulas set by the regional gov-
ernments, using methodologies broadly similar to those applied to federal–
regional grants.
Decentralization to the woreda level is crucial for achieving an equitable dis-
tribution of prosperity. Ethiopian history, sociology, and ethnography all suggest 
that citizen-state relationships are framed by alternative norms of political cul-
ture, power, and state-society relations, which have evolved locally, in the context 
of historical processes of state formation (World Bank 2013). With decentraliza-
tion to the woreda level, budgets allocated for local expenditures have increased 
dramatically. Indicators of human development have similarly improved (net 
enrollment and vaccination rates are just two examples). Decentralization and 
affirmative action are mitigating the effects of economic policies that prevailed 
for more than a century, resulting in more broadly shared economic prosperity.
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Table d.1 Stage 1: education—Linear Regression Association of per Capita education 
expenditures with net enrollment Rate
Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Net Enrollment Rate
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.045
(0.0091)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 174.331
(1,580.6640)
Percentage of rural population −12.283*
(6.7861)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −7.387
(24.1886)
 Anyiwak −11.089
(27.8701)
 Gumuz −16.048
(24.4713)
 Konso −48.182
(44.7173)
 Hist. Adv. −0.967
(7.2677)
 Somali −62.222***
(10.1186)
 Affar 77.755***
(11.4409)
 Other Small −13.178
(8.5432)
Detailed Regression Results
A p p e n d i x  d
table continues next page
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Time controls
 T zero −3.548***
(1.2457)
 T one −4.863***
(0.9834)
 T two −0.301
(0.6894)
 T three Omitted
 Constant 104.449***
(9.4504)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.2 Stage 1: education—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita education 
 expenditures with net enrollment Rate
Quadratic Regression
Dependent variable: Net Enrollment Rate
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.025
(0.0223)
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared −0.00005
(0.00003)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 55.277
(1,583.27)
Percentage of rural population −10.394
(6.8810)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −8.569
(24.1212)
 Anyiwak −13.453
(27.8232)
 Gumuz −18.196
(24.4323)
 Konso −48.041
(44.5685)
 Hist. Adv. −1.193
(7.2454)
 Somali −61.075***
(10.1151)
 Affar −77.279***
(11.4079)
 Other Small −13.489
(8.5172)
table continues next page
Table d.1 Stage 1: education—Linear Regression Association of per Capita education  
expenditures with net enrollment Rate (continued)
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Time controls
 T zero −2.438*
(1.4520)
 T one −3.952***
(1.1585)
 T two 0.087
(0.7375)
 T three Omitted
 Constant 100.071***
(9.8686)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.3 Stage 1: education—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita education 
 expenditures with net enrollment Rate
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Log Net Enrollment Rate
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.276***
(0.0280)
Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 0.040
(0.0293)
Percentage of rural population 0.110
(0.0830)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −0.042
(0.2949)
 Anyiwak −0.545*
(0.3428)
 Gumuz −0.130
(0.3081)
 Konso −0.467
(0.5273)
 Hist. Adv. 0.004
(0.0861)
 Somali −0.845***
(0.1267)
 Affar −1.506***
(0.1490)
 Other Small −0.132
(0.0120)
Table d.2 Stage 1: education—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita education 
 expenditures with net enrollment Rate (continued)
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Time controls
 T zero 0.144***
(0.0266)
 T one 0.091***
(0.0203)
 T two 0.062
(0.0120)
 T three Omitted
Constant 3.263***
(0.2725)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.4 Stage 1: education—Linear Regression Association of per Capita education 
expenditures with pupil-Teacher Ratio
Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Pupil-Teacher Ratio
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education −0.024
(0.0199)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 8,000.899*** 
(2,800.951)
Percentage of rural population 15.676
(4.7215)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −3.408
(13.6348)
 Anyiwak −32.619* 
(17.6828)
 Gumuz −21.557
(14.7049)
 Konso −18.551
(26.2358)
 Hist. Adv. −15.588***
(4.1635)
 Somali 39.245***
(6.1928)
 Affar −26.338***
(7.1540)
 Other Small −7.671
(4.7664)
table continues next page
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Table d.3 Stage 1: education—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita education 
 expenditures with net enrollment Rate (continued)
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Time controls
 T zero 6.381**
(2.6909)
 T one 1.990
(2.1899)
 T two 4.038**
(1.6336)
 T three Omitted
 Constant 43.085***
(8.1009)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.5 Stage 1: education—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita education 
 expenditures with pupil-Teacher Ratio
Quadratic Regression
Dependent variable: Pupil-Teacher Ratio
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education −0.110***
(0.0403)
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared 0.0002**
(0.00006)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 7,472.043*** 
(2,805.786)
Percentage of rural population 12.328**
(4.9101)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −0.908
(13.6528)
 Anyiwak −34.057** 
(17.6673)
 Gumuz −17.969 
(14.7562)
 Konso −18.807 
(26.1966)
 Hist. Adv. −14.821***
(4.1692)
 Somali 35.936***
(6.3310)
table continues next page
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Table d.4 Stage 1: education—Linear Regression Association of per Capita education 
expenditures with pupil-Teacher Ratio (continued)
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 Affar −28.423***
(7.1947)
 Other Small −7.151
(4.7640)
Time controls
 T zero 3.476
(2.9395)
 T one −0.288
(2.3785)
 T two 3.067*
(1.6798)
 T three Omitted
Constant 53.924***
(9.2286)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.6  Stage 1: education—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita education 
 expenditures with pupil-Teacher Ratio 
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Pupil-Teacher Ratio
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Education −0.223***
(0.0203)
Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 0.063*** 
(0.0158)
Percentage of rural population 0.202***
(0.0363)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer 0.234
(0.1176)
 Anyiwak −0.600***
(0.1424)
 Gumuz −0.252
(0.1299)
 Konso −0.315
(0.2126)
 Hist. Adv. −0.227***
(0.0329)
 Somali 0.146**
(0.0528)
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Table d.5 Stage 1: education—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita education 
 expenditures with pupil-Teacher Ratio (continued)
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 Affar −0.556***
(0.0658)
 Other Small −0.129***
(0.0389)
Time controls
 T zero −0.044
(0.0193)
 T one −0.096***
(0.0153)
 T two 0.007
(0.0099)
 T three Omitted
Constant 5.434***
(0.1460)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.7 Stage 1: Health—Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health  
expenditures with penta3 Vaccination Rate
Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Penta3 Vaccination Rate
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health −0.063***
(0.0233)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure −1,447.151 
(1,315.3060)
Percentage of rural population 8.677***
(1.8676)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −64.966*** 
(6.4810)
 Anyiwak −53.901*** 
(8.3259)
 Gumuz −44.426*** 
(7.3255)
 Konso −50.230** 
(24.1339)
 Hist. Adv. −9.565***
(2.0970)
 Somali −51.458***
(2.7817)
table continues next page
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Table d.6  Stage 1: education—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita education 
 expenditures with pupil-Teacher Ratio (continued)
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 Affar −47.295***
(3.2447)
 Other Small −13.755*** 
(2.4127)
Time controls
 T zero −9.362***
(1.2211)
 T one −3.007**
(1.2684)
 T two −6.915***
(0.8858)
 T three Omitted
Constant 91.697***
(3.1549)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.8 Stage 1: Health—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita Health expenditures 
with penta3 Vaccination Rate
Quadratic Regression
Dependent variable: Penta3 Vaccination Rate
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health −0.122***
(0.0395)
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health Squared 0.0003*
(0.0001)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure −1431.498 
(1,315.529)
Percentage of rural population 8.152***
(1.8899)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −64.123*** 
(6.4999)
 Anyiwak −55.78*** 
(8.3911)
 Gumuz −43.354*** 
(7.3510)
 Konso −49.085** 
(24.1561)
 Hist. Adv. −9.581***
(2.0974)
table continues next page
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Table d.7 Stage 1: Health—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health expenditures 
with penta3 Vaccination Rate (continued)
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table continues next page
 Somali −51.333***
(2.7833)
 Affar −46.810***
(3.2567)
 Other Small −13.546***
(2.4160)
Time controls
 T zero −9.963***
(1.2633)
 T one −3.535***
(1.2994)
 T two −7.166***
(0.8955)
 T three Omitted
Constant 93.646***
(3.3278)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.9 Stage 1: Health—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health expendi-
tures with penta3 Vaccination Rate
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Penta3 Vaccination Rate
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Health −0.058**
(0.0276)
Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure −0.003 
(0.0262)
Percentage of rural population 0.182***
(0.0512)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −1.919***
(0.1910)
 Anyiwak −1.018***
(0.2379)
 Gumuz −0.701***
(0.2067)
 Konso −0.626
(0.6551)
 Hist. Adv. −0.141**
(0.0595)
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Table d.8 Stage 1: Health—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita Health expenditures 
with penta3 Vaccination Rate (continued)
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 Somali −1.048***
(0.0796)
 Affar −1.026***
(0.0843)
 Other Small −0.220***
(0.0697)
Time controls
 T zero −0.170***
(0.0404)
 T one −0.095**
(0.0428)
 T two −0.131 ***
(0.0296)
 T three Omitted
Constant 4.613***
(0.2042)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.10 Stage 1: Health—Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health expendi-
tures with Antenatal Care
Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Antenatal Care
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health 0.026
(0.0313)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure −249.548 
(1,711.0580)
Percentage of rural population −10.849***
(2.4200)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −56.384*** 
(8.5451)
 Anyiwak −44.982*** 
(10.2385)
 Gumuz −59.973*** 
(9.1047)
 Konso −42.666 
(30.2839)
 Hist. Adv. −13.034***
(2.5008)
table continues next page
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Table d.9 Stage 1: Health—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health expenditures 
with penta3 Vaccination Rate (continued)
Improving Basic Services for the Bottom Forty Percent • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0331-4 
 Somali −41.722***
(3.4255)
 Affar −59.354***
(4.0043)
 Other Small −13.486*** 
(2.8967)
Time controls
 T zero −13.198***
(1.6319)
 T one −6.886***
(1.6671)
 T two −4.589***
(1.2176)
 T three Omitted
Constant 96.300***
(4.0269)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.11 Stage 1: Health—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita Health 
expenditures with Antenatal Care
Quadratic Regression
Dependent variable: Antenatal Care
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health 0.086
(0.0532)
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health Squared −0.0003
(0.0002)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure −238.134 
(1,711.9540)
Percentage of rural population −10.305***
(2.4525)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −57.340*** 
(8.5779)
 Anyiwak −43.322*** 
(10.3145)
 Gumuz −61.090*** 
(9.1462)
 Konso −43.918
(30.3276)
table continues next page
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Table d.10 Stage 1: Health—Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health expenditures 
with Antenatal Care (continued)
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 Hist. Adv. −13.080***
(2.5029)
 Somali −41.852***
(3.4293)
 Affar −59.895***
(4.0262)
 Other Small −13.747***
(2.9050)
Time controls
 T zero −12.542***
(1.6965)
 T one −6.326***
(1.7131)
 T two −4.323***
(1.2316)
 T three Omitted
Constant 94.305***
(4.2712)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.12 Stage 1: Health—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health 
expenditures with Antenatal Care
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Antenatal Care
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Health 0.086**
(0.0347)
Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure −0.021
(0.0330)
Percentage of rural population −0.016
(0.0671)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −2.710***
(0.2509)
 Anyiwak −0.718***
(0.2905)
 Gumuz −1.1760***
(0.2727)
 Konso −0.635
(0.8460)
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Table d.11 Stage 1: Health—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita Health  
expenditures with Antenatal Care (continued)
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 Hist. Adv. −0.178**
(0.0683)
 Somali −0.852***
(0.1017)
 Affar −1.768***
(0.1280)
 Other Small −0.230***
(0.0815)
Time controls
 T zero −0.197***
(0.0485)
 T one −0.134***
(0.0485)
 T two −0.107 ***
(0.0339)
 T three Omitted
Constant 4.330***
(0.1601)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.13 Stage 1: Health—Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health expendi-
tures with Contraceptive Acceptance Rate
Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Contraceptive Acceptance rate
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health −0.052*
(0.0287)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure −1,371.507 
(1,583.1580)
Percentage of rural population −11.900***
(2.2773)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −64.900*** 
(7.8045)
 Anyiwak −45.951*** 
(9.5779)
 Gumuz −57.212*** 
(8.3646)
 Konso −10.295
(28.6759)
table continues next page
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Table d.12 Stage 1: Health—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health  
expenditures with Antenatal Care (continued)
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 Hist. Adv. −5.363**
(2.3429)
 Somali −61.431***
(3.302)
 Affar −53.855***
(3.7462)
 Other Small −12.126*** 
(2.7181)
Time controls
 T zero −14.651***
(1.4963)
 T one −8.743***
(1.4947)
 T two −3.260***
(1.0739)
 T three Omitted
Constant 83.648***
(3.7609)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.14 Stage 1: Health—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita Health 
expenditures with Contraceptive Acceptance Rate
Quadratic Regression
Dependent variable: Contraceptive Acceptance rate
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health −0.012
(0.0493)
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health Squared −0.00023
(0.0002)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure −1,351.924 
(1,583.894)
Percentage of rural population −11.527***
(2.3092)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer 65.492*** 
(7.8317)
 Anyiwak −45.000*** 
(9.6311)
 Gumuz −57.931*** 
(8.4008)
table continues next page
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Table d.13 Stage 1: Health—Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health expenditures 
with Contraceptive Acceptance Rate (continued)
Improving Basic Services for the Bottom Forty Percent • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0331-4 
table continues next page
 Konso −11.154
(28.7083)
 Hist. Adv. −5.396**
(2.3444)
 Somali −61.430***
(3.3037)
 Affar −54.207***
(3.7654)
 Other Small −12.297***
(2.7251)
Time controls
 T zero −14.187***
(1.5666)
 T one −8.350***
(1.5451)
 T two −3.075***
(1.0896)
 T three Omitted
Constant 82.290***
(4.0021)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.15 Stage 1: Health—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health 
expenditures with Contraceptive Acceptance Rate
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Contraceptive Acceptance rate
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Health −0.006
(0.0410)
Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure −0.056
(0.0390)
Percentage of rural population −0.136
(0.0796)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −4.864***
(0.2766)
 Anyiwak −1.567***
(0.3427)
 Gumuz −1.552***
(0.3164)
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Table d.14 Stage 1: Health—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita Health  
expenditures with Contraceptive Acceptance Rate (continued)
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 Konso −0.232 
(1.0094)
 Hist. Adv. −0.116
(0.0805)
 Somali −2.671***
(0.1225)
 Affar −1.971***
(0.1507)
 Other Small −0.309***
(0.0963)
Time controls
 T zero −0.308***
(0.0561)
 T one −0.221***
(0.0559)
 T two −0.0058**
(0.0371)
 T three Omitted
Constant 4.744***
(0.3058)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d. 16 Stage 1: Health—Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health expendi-
tures with delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant
Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health 0.066***
(0.0287)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 328.600
(1,211.0980)
Percentage of rural population −22.745***
(1.7421)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −15.830***
(5.9881)
 Anyiwak −19.264***
(7.4207)
 Gumuz −17.340***
(6.2405)
table continues next page
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Table d.15 Stage 1: Health—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health  
expenditures with Contraceptive Acceptance Rate (continued)
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 Konso −3.805
(20.9835)
 Hist. Adv. −4.326**
(1.7805)
 Somali −10.021***
(2.5271)
 Affar −9.327***
(2.8013)
 Other Small −5.143**
(2.0568)
Time controls
 T zero −3.308***
(1.1900)
 T one −4.626***
(1.2333)
 T two 1.012
(0.9168)
 T three Omitted
Constant 40.980***
(2.8922)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.17 Stage 1: Health—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita Health 
expenditures with delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant
Quadratic Regression
Dependent variable: Delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health 0.068*
(0.0389)
Yearly expenditure per capita in Health Squared −0.00001
(0.0001)
Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 330.274
(1,211.889)
Percentage of rural population −22.726***
(1.7685)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −15.862***
(6.0100)
 Anyiwak −19.204**
(7.4858)
table continues next page
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Table d. 16 Stage 1: Health—Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health expenditures 
with delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant (continued)
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 Gumuz −17.374***
(6.2652)
 Konso −3.847
(21.0059)
 Hist. Adv. −4.327**
(1.7815)
 Somali −10.024***
(2.5288)
 Affar −9.344***
(2.8147)
 Other Small −5.152**
(2.0616)
Time controls
 T zero −3.285***
(1.2422)
 T one −4.607***
(1.2694)
 T two 1.021
(0.9270)
 T three Omitted
Constant 40.911***
(3.0919)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.18 Stage 1: Health—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health 
expenditures with delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Health 0.267***
(0.0747)
Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure −0.071
(0.0698)
Percentage of rural population −0.720***
(0.1456)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −2.329***
(0.5238)
 Anyiwak −1.914***
(0.6249)
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Table d.17 Stage 1: Health—Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita Health  
expenditures with delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant (continued)
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 Gumuz −0.777**
(0.5637)
 Konso −0.372
(1.7985)
 Hist. Adv. 0.033
(0.1450)
 Somali −0.620***
(0.2224)
 Affar −1.310***
(0.2378)
 Other Small −1.106
(0.1726)
Time controls
 T zero −0.027
(0.0981)
 T one −0.362***
(0.0976)
 T two −0.042
(0.0700)
 T three Omitted
Constant 2.818***
(0.5497)
Note: Probit regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses; Predicted probabilities with unconditional 
standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. 
OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.19 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita 
Agriculture  expenditures with Cereal Yield
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Cereal Yield
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 0.128***
(0. 0489)
Percentage of rural population −0.414*
(0.2205)
Rainfall controls
 Average rainfall 0.000
(0.0008)
 Deviation from average rainfall 0.001**
(0.0007)
 Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.002***
(0.0007)
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Table d.18 Stage 1: Health—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Health  
expenditures with delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant (continued)
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Regional dummies
 Tigray 4.576
(9.0103)
 Afar 3.544
(8.5370)
 Amhara 3.522
(8.9863)
 Oromia 3.951
(8.9503)
 Somali 11.307
(9.2046)
 Beneshangul Gemuz 17.258
(18.0467)
 SNNP 3.502
(8.9883)
 Gambella Omitted
Regional dummies × average rainfall
 Tigray × average rainfall 0.000
(0.0009)
 Afar × average rainfall Omitted
 Amhara × average rainfall 0.000
(0.0009)
 Oromia × average rainfall 0.000
(0.0008)
 Somali × average rainfall −0.010***
(0.0027)
 Beneshangul Gemuz × average rainfall −0.011
(0.0128)
 SNNP × average rainfall 0.000
(0.0008)
 Gambella × average rainfall Omitted
Regional dummies × Poverty rate
 Tigray × Poverty rate −0.020
(0.0182)
 Afar × Poverty rate Omitted
 Amhara × Poverty rate −0.003
(0.0058)
 Oromia × Poverty rate 0.002
(0.0063)
 Somali × Poverty rate −0.078***
(0.0200)
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Table d.19 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Agriculture  
expenditures with Cereal Yield (continued)
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 Beneshangul Gemuz × Poverty rate −0.036
(0.0438)
 SNNP × Poverty rate 0.000
(0.0025)
 Gambella × Poverty rate 0.102
(0.2498)
Constant −1.510
(8.9315)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small 
scale of agriculture in these regions. OLS = ordinary least squares; SNNP = Southern Nations, Nationalities, and 
Peoples (Region).
Table d.20 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita 
Agriculture  expenditures with pulses Yield
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Pulses Yield
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture −0.020
(0.0645)
Percentage of rural population 0.105
(0.2456)
Rainfall controls
 Average rainfall 0.001
(0.0014)
 Deviation from average rainfall 0.001
(0.0010)
 Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.001
(0.0010)
Regional dummies
 Tigray 3.165
(2.126)
 Afar 0.918
(1.1132)
 Amhara 2.115
(1.9126)
 Oromia 3.184*
(1.8845)
 Somali 3.569
(3.0569)
 Beneshangul Gemuz 39.151*
(20.4730)
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Table d.19 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Agriculture 
 expenditures with pulses Yield (continued)
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 SNNP 2.462
(1.9117)
 Gambella Omitted
Regional dummies × average rainfall
 Tigray × average rainfall −0.001
(0.0015)
 Afar × average rainfall Omitted
 Amhara × average rainfall 0.000
(0.0014)
 Oromia × average rainfall −0.001
(0.0014)
 Somali × average rainfall −0.002
(0.0036)
 Beneshangul Gemuz × average rainfall −0.030*
(0.0166)
 SNNP × average rainfall −0.001
(0.0014)
 Gambella × average rainfall Omitted
Regional dummies × Poverty rate
 Tigray × Poverty rate −0.012
(0.0196)
 Afar × Poverty rate Omitted
 Amhara × Poverty rate −0.008
(0.0063)
 Oromia × Poverty rate −0.010
(0.0070)
 Somali × Poverty rate −0.027
(0.0265)
 Beneshangul Gemuz × Poverty rate −0.126**
(0.0563)
 SNNP × Poverty rate 0.002
(0.0027)
 Gambella × Poverty rate Omitted
Constant −0.213
(1.8785)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares; SNNP 
=Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (Region). Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture 
in these regions
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Table d.20 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Agriculture 
 expenditures with pulses Yield (continued)
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Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Root Crop Yield
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 0.320
(0.2266)
Percentage of rural population −0.082
(0.7218)
Rainfall controls
 Average rainfall 0.000
(0.0032)
 Deviation from average rainfall 0.002
(0.0039)
 Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.010
(0.0039)
Regional dummies
 Tigray 0.739
(5.2598)
 Afar Omitted
 Amhara 0.314
(4.4270)
 Oromia 0.579
(4.4138)
 Somali −1.041
(5.5139)
 Beneshangul Gemuz 4.842
(43.2237)
 SNNP 0.626
(4.4447)
 Gambella Omitted
Regional dummies × average rainfall
 Tigray × average rainfall 0.000
(0.0036)
 Afar × average rainfall Omitted
 Amhara × average rainfall 0.000
(0.0033)
 Oromia × average rainfall 0.000
(0.0033)
 Somali × average rainfall 0.003
(0.0069)
 Beneshangul Gemuz × average rainfall −0.003
(0.0351)
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Table d.21 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Agricul-
ture  expenditures with Root Crop Yield
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 SNNP × average rainfall 0.000
(0.0033)
 Gambella × average rainfall Omitted
Regional dummies × Poverty rate
 Tigray × Poverty rate 0.012
(0.0618)
 Afar × Poverty rate Omitted
 Amhara × Poverty rate −0.008
(0.0170)
 Oromia × Poverty rate −0.009
(0.0211)
 Somali × Poverty rate Omitted
 Beneshangul Gemuz × Poverty rate −0.006
(0.1203)
 SNNP × Poverty rate −0.016**
(0.0074)
 Gambella × Poverty rate Omitted
Constant 2.431
(4.5185)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares; SNNP = 
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (Region). Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture 
in these regions.
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Table d.21 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Agriculture 
 expenditures with Root Crop Yield (continued)
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Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Vegetable Yield
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 0.582***
(0.1330)
Percentage of rural population −0.110
(0.5548)
Rainfall controls
 Average rainfall 0.001
(0.0021)
 Deviation from average rainfall 0.001
(0.0020)
 Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) −0.003
(0.0021)
Regional dummies
 Tigray 32.703
(22.4893)
 Afar 34.322
(22.5041)
 Amhara 32.568
(22.4326)
 Oromia 33.773
(22.3465)
 Somali 10.227
(22.9840)
 Beneshangul Gemuz 35.983
(43.4964)
 SNNP 31.791
(22.4365)
 Gambella Omitted
Regional dummies × average rainfall
 Tigray × average rainfall −0.002
(0.0024)
 Afar × average rainfall −0.005
(0.0042)
 Amhara × average rainfall −0.002
(0.0022)
 Oromia × average rainfall −0.002
(0.0021)
 Somali × average rainfall 0.031***
(0.0067)
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Table d.22 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Agricul-
ture  expenditures with Vegetable Yield
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 Beneshangul Gemuz × average rainfall −0.005
(0.0306)
 SNNP × average rainfall 0.001
(0.0021)
 Gambella × average rainfall Omitted
Regional dummies × Poverty rate
 Tigray × Poverty rate 0.004
(0.0618)
 Afar × Poverty rate Omitted
 Amhara × Poverty rate −0.003
(0.0145)
 Oromia × Poverty rate −0.034**
(0.0159)
 Somali × Poverty rate 0.185***
(0.0490)
 Beneshangul Gemuz × Poverty rate −0.036
(0.1049)
 SNNP × Poverty rate −0.004
(0.0064)
 Gambella × Poverty rate 0.919
(0.6237)
Constant −29.575
(22.3062)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares; SNNP = 
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (Region). Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture 
in these regions
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Table d.22 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Agriculture 
 expenditures with Vegetable Yield (continued)
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Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Oil seeds Yield
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture −0.118
(0.1899)
Percentage of rural population −0.229
(0.6220)
Rainfall controls
 Average rainfall −0.008***
(0.0024)
 Deviation from average rainfall −0.001
(0.0034)
 Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) −0.001
(0.0036)
Regional dummies
 Tigray −43.523*
(25.2816)
 Afar −38.156
(24.0540)
 Amhara −42.608*
(25.2609)
 Oromia −42.904*
(25.1993)
 Somali −41.315*
(24.3306)
 Beneshangul Gemuz −52.981
(44.3822)
 SNNP −44.061*
(25.2585)
 Gambella Omitted
Regional dummies × average rainfall
 Tigray × average rainfal 0.008***
(0.0027)
 Afar × average rainfall Omitted
 Amhara × average rainfall 0.008***
(0.0025)
 Oromia × average rainfall 0.008***
(0.0025)
 Somali × average rainfall Omitted
 Beneshangul Gemuz × average rainfall 0.017***
(0.0025)
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Table d.23 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Agricul-
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 SNNP × average rainfall 0.009***
(0.0025)
 Gambella × average rainfall Omitted
Regional dummies × Poverty rate
 Tigray × Poverty rate 0.017
(0.0450)
 Afar × Poverty rate Omitted
 Amhara × Poverty rate 0.001
(0.0144)
 Oromia × Poverty rate 0.007
(0.0186)
 Somali × Poverty rate Omitted
 Beneshangul Gemuz × Poverty rate 0.012
(0.1041)
 SNNP × Poverty rate 0.000
(0.7084)
 Gambella × Poverty rate −1.044*
(0.7084)
Constant 45.731*
(25.1903)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares; SNNP = 
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (Region). Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture 
in these regions
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Table d.23 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Agriculture 
 expenditures with Oil Seeds Yield (continued)
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Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Enset Yield
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 2.397***
(0. 5766)
Percentage of rural population −1.091
(1.7449)
Rainfall controls
 Average rainfall 0.000
(0.0011)
 Deviation from average rainfall 0.010
(0.0168)
 Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.068***
(0.0157)
Regional dummies
 Tigray Omitted
 Afar Omitted
 Amhara Omitted
 Oromia 8.654***
(3.0691)
 Somali Omitted
 Beneshangul Gemuz Omitted
 SNNP 1.357
(1.4055)
 Gambella Omitted
Regional dummies × average rainfall
 Tigray × average rainfall Omitted
 Afar × average rainfall Omitted
 Amhara × average rainfall Omitted
 Oromia × average rainfall −0.005***
(0.0016)
 Somali × average rainfall Omitted
 Beneshangul Gemuz × average rainfall Omitted
 SNNP × average rainfall Omitted
 Gambella × average rainfall Omitted
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Table d.24 Stage 1: Agriculture—Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita Agricul-
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Regional dummies × Poverty rate
 Tigray × Poverty rate Omitted
 Afar × Poverty rate Omitted
 Amhara × Poverty rate Omitted
 Oromia × Poverty rate −0.034
(0.0527)
 Somali × Poverty rate Omitted
 Beneshangul Gemuz × Poverty rate Omitted
 SNNP × Poverty rate 0.020***
(4.3094)
 Gambella × Poverty rate −1.044*
(0.7084)
Constant −13.452***
(4.3094)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** = coefficients 
significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares; SNNP = Southern Nations, 
Nationalities, and Peoples (Region). Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture in these regions
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table continues next page
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Fruit Yield
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 1.790***
(0.2669)
Percentage of rural population −0.794
(0.9149)
Rainfall controls
 Average rainfall 0.000
(0.0006)
 Deviation from average rainfall 0.002
(0.0048)
 Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.028***
(0.0050)
Regional dummies
 Tigray −2.459
(3.3924)
 Afar 4.850*
(2.8878)
 Amhara −0.309
(0.9558)
 Oromia 2.933**
(1.2536)
 Somali −5.032
(6.4944)
 Beneshangul Gemuz −108.598**
(55.213)
 SNNP Omitted
 Gambella Omitted
Regional dummies × average rainfall
 Tigray × average rainfall 0.001
(0.0019)
 Afar × average rainfall −0.009
(0.0059)
 Amhara × average rainfall 0.001
(0.0013)
 Oromia × average rainfall −0.002**
(0.0008)
 Somali × average rainfall 0.005
(0.0090)
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 Beneshangul Gemuz × average rainfall 0.087*
(0.0448)
 SNNP × average rainfall Omitted
 Gambella × average rainfall Omitted
Regional dummies × Poverty rate
 Tigray × Poverty rate 0.002
(0.0665)
 Afar × Poverty rate Omitted
 Amhara × Poverty rate −0.023
(0.0213)
 Oromia × Poverty rate −0.019
(0.0267)
 Somali × Poverty rate 0.113
(0.0727)
 Beneshangul Gemuz × Poverty rate 0.288*
(0.1537)
 SNNP × Poverty rate 0.014
(0.0093)
 Gambella × Poverty rate Omitted
Constant −4.019***
(1.4968)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares; SNNP = 
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (Region). Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture 
in these regions
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table continues next page
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Coffee Yield
independent variables: OLS
Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 1.267***
(0. 2342)
Percentage of rural population −0.777
(0.7845)
Rainfall controls
 Average rainfall 0.000
(0.0005)
 Deviation from average rainfall −0.001
(0.0048)
 Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.029***
(0.0049)
Regional dummies
 Tigray Omitted
 Afar Omitted
 Amhara −0.632
(0.8110)
 Oromia 2.014*
(1.0696)
 Somali 1.43**
(0.6380)
 Beneshangul Gemuz −18.760
(46.6977)
 SNNP Omitted
 Gambella Omitted
Regional dummies × average rainfall
 Tigray × average rainfall Omitted
 Afar × average rainfall Omitted
 Amhara × average rainfall 0.000
(0.0011)
 Oromia × average rainfall −0.001***
(0.0007)
 Somali × average rainfall Omitted
 Beneshangul Gemuz × average rainfall 0.014
(0.0379)
 SNNP × average rainfall Omitted
 Gambella × average rainfall Omitted
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Regional dummies × Poverty rate
 Tigray × Poverty rate Omitted
 Afar × Poverty rate Omitted
 Amhara × Poverty rate −0.012
(0.0180)
 Oromia × Poverty rate 0.004
(0.0228)
 Somali × Poverty rate Omitted
 Beneshangul Gemuz × Poverty rate 0.068
(0.1300)
 SNNP × Poverty rate 0.007
(0.0082)
 Gambella × Poverty rate Omitted
Constant −4.095***
(1.3591)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares; SNNP = 
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (Region). Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture 
in these regions
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table continues next page
Dependent variable: Any Improved Technique, 2011
independent variables: Probit Predicted Probability
Yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 0.0033
(0.00029)
Poverty rate 0.0075**
(0.00295)
Rainfall controls
 Average rainfall −0.00078***
(0.00007)
 Deviation from average rainfall 2011 −0.00306***
(0.00046)
 Deviation from average rainfall 2010 0.0090***
(0.00043)
Regional dummies
 Tigray omitted
 Afar −5.1478***
(0.58951)
 Amhara −2.8538***
(0.13734)
 Oromia −0.02614
(0.14042)
 Somali −1.1050
(2.79749)
 Beneshangul Gemuz −28.8422***
(5.38058)
 SNNP −0.9599
(0.14272)
 Gambella 40.0622
Regional dummies × average rainfall
 Tigray × average rainfall omitted
 Afar × average rainfall omitted
 Amhara × average rainfall 0.0031***
(0.00007)
 Oromia × average rainfall −0.00001
(0.00007)
 Somali × average rainfall −0.0025
(0.00408)
 Beneshangul Gemuz × average rainfall 0.0234***
(0.00434)
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 SNNP × average rainfall 0.0005***
(0.00008)
 Gambella × average rainfall 0.0022*** 
0.00066
Regional dummies × Poverty rate
 Tigray × Poverty rate omitted
 Afar × Poverty rate 0.1298***
(0.01668)
 Amhara × Poverty rate −0.0027
(0.00304)
 Oromia × Poverty rate −0.0207***
(0.00307)
 Somali × Poverty rate −0.0016
(0.02692)
 Beneshangul Gemuz × Poverty rate 0.0446***
(0.01563)
 SNNP × Poverty rate −0.0010
(0.00298)
 Gambella × Poverty rate −1.4040
Quintile
 Smallest/Poorest omitted 0.0003***
(0.00002)
 Second/Poorer 0.0445***
(0.01386)
0.0003***
(0.00003)
 Middle/Middle 0.3727***
(0.01282)
0.0005***
(0.00004)
 Fourth/Richer 0.5961***
(0.01265)
0.0006***
(0.00005)
 Largest/Richest 0.8211***
(0.01280)
0.0008***
(0.00007)
Constant −1.7225***
(0.15902)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels.
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Table d.28 Gender issues: Linear Regression Association of per Capita education expendi-
tures with net enrollment Rate for Males
Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Net Enrollment Rate—Male
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.0438***
(0.0070)
Percentage of rural population −7.011
(5.71317)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer 6.7239
(6.35115)
 Anyiwak −17.9619
(13.65227)
 Gumuz 2.1839
(7.19484)
 Konso −34.8711*
(19.43414)
 Other Small 0.7764
(3.70825)
Constant 84.8515***
(5.20259)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
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Table d.29  Gender issues: Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita education 
expenditures with net enrollment Rate for Males
Quadratic Regression
Dependent variable: Net Enrollment Rate—Male
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.095***
(0.0180)
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared −0.0001***
(0.00005)
Percentage of rural population −6.474
(5.6910)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer 5.652
(6.4082)
 Anyiwak −11.147
(12.9711)
 Gumuz 0.707
(7.0657)
 Konso −34.690*
(19.6667)
 Other Small 0.632
(3.6941)
Constant 81.002***
(5.2059)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.30  Gender issues: Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita education 
expenditures with net enrollment Rate for Males
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Log Net Enrollment Rate—Male
independent variables: OLS
Log of yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.115***
(0.0116)
Constant 3.752***
(0.0627)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
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table continues next page
Dependent variable: Net Enrollment Rate—Female
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.0476***
(0.00756)
Percentage of rural population −12.2364**
(5.53352)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −10.2088***
(3.26873)
 Anyiwak −21.4472***
(12.98825)
 Gumuz −22.8067***
(8.07086)
 Konso −37.6488***
(13.07193)
 Other Small −8.2162**
(3.91541)
Constant 87.8880***
(5.09835)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.32  Gender issues: Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita education 
expenditures with net enrollment Rate for Females
Quadratic Regression
Dependent variable: Net Enrollment Rate—Female
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.095***
(0.0180)
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared −0.0001***
(0.00005)
Percentage of rural population −11.682**
(5.5100)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −11.325***
(3.3056)
 Anyiwak −14.655
(12.271)
 Gumuz −24.307***
(7.9683)
 Konso −37.462***
(13.3247)
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 Other Small −8.355**
(3.8904)
Constant 81.002***
(5.2059)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.33  Gender issues: Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita education 
expenditures with net enrollment Rate for Females
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Log Net Enrollment Rate—Female
independent variables: OLS
Log of yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.158***
(0.0137)
Constant 3.505***
(0.0746)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.34 Gender issues: Linear Regression Association of per Capita education expendi-
tures with net intake Rate for Males
Dependent variable: Net Intake Rate—Male
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.1670***
(0.01702)
Percentage of rural population 31.6473***
(5.71317)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −74.3077***
(5.43405)
 Anyiwak −95.4275***
(20.37484)
 Gumuz −54.9533***
(11.42498)
 Konso −27.4514
(22.54912)
 Other Small −3.7305
(4.52154)
Constant 43.4391***
(6.55315)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
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Quadratic Regression
Dependent variable: Net Intake Rate—Male
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.418***
(0.0275
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared −0.0006***
(0.00007)
Percentage of rural population 34.070***
(6.8756)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −81.015***
(4.4688)
 Anyiwak −64.507***
(11.3181)
 Gumuz −61.676***
(11.3097)
 Konso −29.614
(22.6827)
 Other Small −4.308
(4.5489)
Constant 24.648***
(6.1562)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.36  Gender issues: Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita education 
expenditures with net intake Rate for Males
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Log Net Intake Rate—Male
independent variables: OLS
Log of yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.390***
(0.0240)
Constant 2.420***
(0.1202)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
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Dependent variable: Net Intake Rate—Female
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.16698***
(0.01642)
Percentage of rural population 0.0476***
(6.51252)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −71.7297***
(5.09329)
 Anyiwak −93.7788***
(20.3585)
 Gumuz −61.4025***
(9.81233)
 Konso −18.8002
(18.30648)
 Other Small −10.58377**
(4.31694)
Constant 44.9443***
(6.10655)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.38  Gender issues: Quadratic Regression Association of per Capita education 
expenditures with net intake Rate for Females
Quadratic Regression
Dependent variable: Net Intake Rate—Female
independent variables: OLS
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.404***
(0.0273)
Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared −0.0006***
(.00007)
Percentage of rural population 28.551***
(6.2956)
Ethnicity controls
 Nuwer −78.070***
(4.2173)
 Anyiwak −64.674***
(11.6827)
 Gumuz −67.738***
(9.8523)
 Konso −20.859
(18.5272)
table continues next page
100 Detailed Regression Results
Table d.37  Gender issues: Linear Regression Association of per Capita education expendi-
tures with net intake Rate for Females
Improving Basic Services for the Bottom Forty Percent • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0331-4 
 Other Small −11.122**
(4.3080)
Constant 27.221***
(5.7160)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.39  Gender issues: Log Linear Regression Association of per Capita education 
expenditures with net intake Rate for Females
Log Linear Regression
Dependent variable: Log Net Intake Rate—Female
independent variables: OLS
Log of yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.430***
(.0269)
Constant 2.183***
(0.1354)
Note: Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; * , **, *** = 
coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. OLS = ordinary least squares.
Table d.40  Gender issues: predicted probabilities for Farmers' Use of Any improved 
Technique by Gender, 2011
Dependent variable: Any Improved Technique by gender, 2011
independent variables: Probit Predicted  
Probability
Yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 0.0019
(0.00032)
Poverty rate 0.0089***
(0.00285)
Rainfall controls
 Average rainfall −0.00060***
(0.00007)
 Deviation from average rainfall 2011 −0.00379***
(0.00046)
 Deviation from average rainfall 2010 0.0090***
(0.00043)
Regional dummies
 Tigray omitted
 Afar −5.9148***
(0.57195)
 Amhara −2.8286***
(0.13357)
 Oromia 0.32604
(0.13683)
table continues next page
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 Somali −1.5086
(2.71172)
 Beneshangul Gemuz −33.9580***
(5.17708)
 SNNP −0.0528
(0.14926)
 Gambella 43.2032
Regional dummies × average rainfall
 Tigray × average rainfall omitted
 Afar × average rainfall omitted
 Amhara × average rainfall 0.0031***
(0.00007)
 Oromia × average rainfall −0.00036
(0.00007)
 Somali × average rainfall −0.0058
(0.00395)
 Beneshangul Gemuz × average rainfall 0.0277***
(0.00418)
 SNNP × average rainfall 0.0028***
(0.00008)
 Gambella × average rainfall 0.0013*** 
0.00081
Regional dummies × Poverty rate
 Tigray × Poverty rate omitted
 Afar × Poverty rate 0.1515***
(0.01644)
 Amhara × Poverty rate −0.0071
(0.00295)
 Oromia × Poverty rate −0.0207***
(0.00297)
 Somali × Poverty rate −0.0369
(0.02617)
 Beneshangul Gemuz × Poverty rate 0.0528***
(0.01504)
 SNNP × Poverty rate −0.0040
(0.00298)
 Gambella × Poverty rate −1.4770
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Table d.40  Gender issues: predicted probabilities for Farmers' Use of Any improved Technique 
by Gender, 2011 (continued)
table continues next page
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Sex
 Male 0.0002*** 0.00003***
(0.00000)
 Female −0.0001***
(0.00001)
−0.00002***
(0.00000)
Constant −1.2469***
(0.15362)
Note: Probit regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses; Predicted probabilities with unconditional 
standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. 
SNNP = Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (Region). Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of 
agriculture in these regions.
Table d.40  Gender issues: predicted probabilities for Farmers' Use of Any improved Technique 
by Gender, 2011 (continued)
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